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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Definitional Considerations
Police search is a form of governmental information gathering.
The acquisition of intelligence is vital to the police function of detect-
ing and preventing crime, and the process involves such diverse ac-
tivities as electronic surveillance and wiretapping, the use of infor-
mants or data volunteered by citizens, the scientific analysis of evi-
dence, and the practice of visual observation by patrolling officers. A
suitable definition of "search" is impossible save by reference to
synonyms, I and just when a "surveillance" becomes a "search" or a
"search " becomes an "analysis" is often a question of degree depend-
ing upon the focus and objectives of the information seeker. 2 Likewise,
it may be difficult to determine the point at which a police officer
1. See, e.g., 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures § 1 (1952). It has been said that "[wihether the
government's activity is considered a 'search' depends upon whether the individual's reasonable
expectations of privacy are disturbed." Davis v. United States, 413 F.2d 1226, 1232 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Ryles, 291 F. Supp. 492 (D. Del. 1968). See also United States v. On Lee,
193 F.2d 306, 313 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank, J., dissenting); Minnick v. State, 3 Md. App. 652, 241
A.2d 153 (Md. Spec. App. 1968). Whether a particular information-gathering activity constitutes
a "search" is of more than academic importance; it may determine whatever sanctions are to be
applied to it. E.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
2. See 36 BROOKLYN L. REV. 440, 444-45 (1970); 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 968, 974 (1968).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT
oversteps the line between a "surveillance," which he has a duty to
perform, and a "search," where his actions are governed by various
legal criteria.
Police seizure presents similar difficulties since it basically in-
volves police conduct calculated to bring the subject of the seizure
within the custody and control of the law. Police "seize" human
beings, as well as animate and inanimate objects. Much like a search,
a seizure will often involve questions of degree, and it may be a
difficult question to determine precisely the point at which a "detention
for questioning" becomes an "arrest."
'3
B. The Relationship Between and Significance of
Search and Seizure
Police search and seizure are interrelated activities. The arrest of
a person and the seizure of a thing are parallel activities which may or
may not be incident to a search. A complicating factor is the judicial
warrant system, which requires prior judicial approval for certain
types of police searches and seizures. The warrant system is superim-
posed over the entire range of governmental searches and seizures of
persons or things. The body of Anglo-American law relating to police
search and seizure is concerned primarily with sorting out the cir-
cumstances in which police may search or seize without first obtaining
a warrant. 4 This body of law is of crucial importance to a free society,
because police search and seizure involves conduct which infringes on
civil liberty. There is an inherent conflict between the power of police
to search and seize and the right of citizens to live in privacy, free of
unwanted governmental intrusion. At the same time, police powers of
search and seizure are necessary to efficient law enforcement without
which the citizen is subject to criminal acts which are equally inimical
to his liberty.
C. Basic Similarities Between English and American Law
The law of search and seizure in England and the United States is
substantially similar. The basic principles of both legal systems gener-
ally correspond due to their common heritage, as do the functions and
activities of the police within the criminal justice framework. There
3. The distinction between an arrest and a lesser form of detention is an old one. See
Comment, Stop and Frisk: An Historical Answer to a Modern Problem, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
532, 534-35 (1967). There is some judicial recognition of a limited police power to stop individuals
in the course of investigation. See 21 vAND. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (1968). The power is, however,
limited, and wholesale detention to obtain fingerprints is precluded by the fourth amendment,
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), although obtaining information about physical charac-
teristics may be otherwise appropriate. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United
States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
4. Most appellate court cases deal with police searches and seizures which are conducted
without a warrant (or with an invalid warrant) or beyond the provisions of or inconsistently with
a warrant, since with a valid warrant police may search in a reasonable manner pursuant to its
terms. Legal issues rarely arise where warrants have been validly issued.
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are differences, of course, but it is important to keep these within the
perspective of an overall similarity. Many of the differences are caused
by differing English and American assumptions as to whether police
will themselves abide by legal norms or whether maximum judicial
control of the police is required. In England, great stress is placed
upon police self-restraint. "The police are expected to act reasonably;
and so long as they do so, the accused is ... unlikely to insist upon his
right to immunity from search." 5 Americans, on the other hand, dis-
trust their police and tend to seek greater judicial control of their
activities, as is reflected in decisions stressing judicial disfavour of
warrantless searches. 6
Part of the explanation for the differing English and American
assumptions regarding control of the police lies in the initial and
continuing concern of British police with their public image, 7 and the
express constitutional provision for a warrant in the United States. An
explanation can also be found in each country's historical experience
with its police. Since the basic principles of both legal systems gener-
ally correspond, it may be that with an adjustment in British attitudes
towards their police8 and with an anticipated de-emphasis of restric-
tions upon the police by the present United States Supreme Court, the
law of the two countries will grow even closer in this area.
D. Scope and Foundations of the Article
Given the likelihood of change in the law of search and seizure in
the United States and the possibility of such change in England, a
comparative study of the two systems may be helpful in illuminating
desirable directions of change. The comparison which this article will
5. P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 64 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DEVLIN].
6. See Kitch, The Supreme Court's Code of Criminal Procedure: 1968-1969 Edition, 1969
Sup. CT. REV. 155, 155-56 [hereinafter cited as Kitch]. These statements are general in nature
and, of course, there are exceptions. It should be added that while the English trust their police,
they have been unwilling to extend to them a great deal more power than they now possess. See,
e.g., Thomas, The Law of Search and Seizure, 1967 CRIM. L. REv. Eng. 3, 16-17 [hereinafter cited
as Thomas]; See also D. KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 99-100 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as KARLEN].
7. See T.A. CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY OF THE POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1900-1966
52-53, 291 (1967) [hereinafter cited as CRITCHLEY].
8. "As the English police-now forced by organized criminal gangs accustomed to using
modem tools and methods-adopt appropriate counter-organization, the traditional view of the
police as a somewhat specialized collection of ordinary citizens becomes anachronistic." KARLEN,
supra note 6, at 14. Police tend to evolve unlawful practices to combat crime under the influence
of public pressure and rising crime rates. See Barrett, Police Practices and Law-From Arrest to
Release or Charge, 50 CALIF. L.REv. 11, 14 (1962); Warner, Modern Trends in the American
Law of Arrest, 21 CAN. B. REV. 192, 195-96 (1943). Certain British police search and seizure
practices are beginning to attract attention. See Zander, Within the Grasp of the Law, The
Guardian (London), March 17, 1972, at 12 [hereinafter referred to as Zander]. Some control of
the police possibly could result, particularly if abuses toward growing minorities develop.
"Doubts about the ends for which power is being exercised create pressure to limit the discretion
with which that power is exercised." Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Packer].
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undertake deals primarily with the question of warrantless police
search, together with related seizure of chattels and the interception of
communications. Although the principles of probable cause and relia-
bility of evidence will be discussed initially, the questions of whether
and under what circumstances warrants are required arise more fre-
quently with regard to the principle of particularity-the problem of
defining the circumstances and purposes for which searches and sei-
zures may be made. A discussion of those questions requires an exami-
nation of the entire process of police search and seizure, during which
it will be necessary to mention peripherally such subjects as arrest,
searches pursuant to a warrant, and searches not ordinarily conducted
by the police, in order to present a complete conceptual scheme.
For the most part the discussion will be based on the law of
search and seizure in America as developed by the United States Su-
preme Court, supplemented by decisions of other courts, and by
general theory. There is no uniform body of "American law" of search
and seizure because of the federal structure of the United States, in
which the courts of the 50 states and of the federal government render
opinions which often conflict with those of other courts (and frequently
their own.)9 Since the area of search and seizure in the United States is
governed by the fourth amendment,' 0 however, the final authority on
the subject is federal law as interpreted by the Supreme Court."
American law provides the major portion of material for this discus-
sion due to the use of the exclusionary rule in the United States. 12 The
issue of the legality of a search is more likely to be litigated in the
United States than in England, where the rule is not used except to
avoid hardship or injustice to an accused. 13 As a result, there is a-vast
9. See D. KARLIN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1-24 (1970).
10. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See, e.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
Unlike ordinary determinations of reasonableness, the question of the reasonableness of a search
or seizure is generally left to judicial decision rather than to a jury. See Waite, Reasonable Search
and Research, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 623, 625 (1938) [hereinafter cited as Waite].
12. The exclusionary rule proscribes the use at trial of any evidence previously obtained by
illegal search or seizure. It applies both to federal and state trials. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The rule also bars the use of derivative
evidence, Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), unless the government
shows that the challenged evidence came from a remote or independent source. Nardone v. United
States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939). The rule applies to confessions as well as real evidence. Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The illegality of a search cannot always be asserted. One must
have standing to contest the search derived from presence on the searched premises, a proprietary
or possessory interest in the premises, or through being charged with illegal possession of the seized
items. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973). Existence of the exclusionary rule nonetheless
forces the courts to examine carefully and articulate applicable principles of search and seizure law
even in such cases.
13. See R. v. Palfrey, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 416 (C.A.); Kuruma v. R., 1[1955] A.C. 197 (P.C.),
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disparity in the comprehensiveness and development of the law of the
two countries. 14 American courts have been forced by recurrent litiga-
tion to articulate a reasonably coherent and consistent body of law,
while the English law is ad hoc, "haphazard and ill defined. 1 5
II. GENERAL COMMENTARY
A. Basic Anglo-American Search and Seizure Requirements
In order to ease the conflict between the interest in individual
privacy and the necessity of efficient law enforcement, Anglo-
American law has evolved three basic requirements for police search
and seizure: particularity, probable cause, and reliability of evidence.
The requirement of particularity ensures that police search and seizure
may lawfully be conducted only in certain defined circumstances and
for designated purposes. The requirement of probable cause applies to
that degree of probity which is required of any evidence indicating that
such particular circumstances exist. The third requirement reflects the
conviction that the evidence used to determine the existence of those
circumstances be reasonably reliable.
These three libertarian requirements should in theory apply to all
forms of police search and seizure. Such is not the case, however,
because these are flexible and dynamic principles and because police
search and seizure is a process involving human interactions of infinite
variety. As a result, the law of search and seizure becomes far more
complex than theory would permit. An explanation for this complexity
is found in the individual predilections of different judges that influence
the choice of which interest-that of individual freedom or that of
Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 K.B. 164. Should English courts lose confidence in their assumption
that police will use self-restraint, it is yet possible England could adopt the rule as well. Cf.
DEVLIN, supra note 5, at 64-65; Williams, Search and Seizure: A Comment, 1967 CRIM. L. REV.
(Eng.) 20, 23-24 [hereinafter cited as Williams]. Differences in substantive crimes help explain why
American police use search powers more frequently than English police and why there is greater
public resistance to such practices. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 131-32.
14 "Strong passions and prejudices in the United States have resulted in great intensity of
thought about the problem of police power, whereas among English lawyers there seems to be a
lack of enthusiasm for rigorous thinking about police power." KARLEN, supra note 6, at 100.
15. DEVLIN, supra note 5, at 63. "[T]he exclusionary rule has not only made the police more
directly subject to the Constitution; it has also taken the Court into the business of police
administration." Kitch, supra note 6, at 158. In the general area of privacy the British have been
taking certain steps toward a comprehensive approach to their laws. In 1970 a Committee on
Privacy was appointed
to consider whether legislation is needed to give further protection to the individual
citizen and to commercial and industrial interests against intrusions into privacy by
private persons and organizations, or by companies, and to make recommendations.
In July 1972, the committee made its report. COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, FIRST REPORT, CMND.
No. 5012 (1972). The report deals with intrusions by the nongovernmental sector and so
necessitates only passing reference here. It is, however, valuable for insight into the British
system of law, particularly in its discussion of the contrast between the American and Scottish
systems, which emphasize several statutory or constitutional rights, and the English system
which relies heavily on the courts to apply general principles of law to widely ranging and
differing circumstances. See COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, FIRST REPORT, CMND. No. 5012, ch. 2
(1972).
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efficient law enforcement-is to prevail in a particular case. 16 Also,
these principles are still developing, and the desirability of their appli-
cations to all forms of police search and seizure is only gradually
coming to be recognized. Of the three, the principle of probable cause
is the best developed and most universally applied, although the
reliability of evidence is being required with increasing frequency. The
law regarding the definition of the particular circumstances and purposes
for which there may be a lawful police search and seizure is only begin-
ning to stabilize. It may yet take some time because it is this area of the
law that deals with the question of whether a judicial warrant should be
employed.
1. PROBABLE CAUSE
Probably the most universally appreciated and applied of the
three major requirements of search and seizure is that of probable
cause. 17 The probable cause requirement demands that searches and
seizures be based on a certain standard of evidence from which it may
be inferred, with a certain degree of probability, that circumstances
exist justifying governmental intrusion through a search or seizure. 18
The requirement thus relates to the quantum of evidence and quality
of inferences from that evidence which are necessary to justify a search
or seizure. This relationship is often expressed in terms of the burden
of proof which the government must meet in order to establish the
lawfulness of its action. The burden of proof under the probable cause
requirement is usually described as a standard of evidence of a degree
of probity sufficient to lead a reasonable, discrete and prudent man to
the requisite conclusion that a particular search or seizure should be
made.' 9 It is possible to vary the kind of evidence which may be used
to meet the burden, 20 but generally any real or testimonial evidence is
permissible as long as it is reasonably factual2' and gives rise to an
16. See Packer, supra note 8; Waite, supra note 11, at 628.
17. The term "probable cause" has equivalent phraseology, and particular statutes or
jurisdictions may employ terminology such as "reasonable grounds to suspect," "probable suspi-
cion," "probable grounds to believe" or the like. Such phraseology typically has a meaning
identical to that of "probable cause," which is the form ordinarily used in the United States
because that phrase is used in the fourth amendment. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 117. See LaFave,
"Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH.L. REV.
39, 73 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LaFave].
18. Cf. Dallison v. Caffery, [1965] 1 Q.B. 348, 365. For an excellent discussion of probable
cause under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, see Current Law Statutes Annotated, 1971, general
note accompanying ch. 38, § 23.
19. Cf Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435 (1925); Shaaban Bin Hussien v. Chong Fook
Kam, [1970] A.C. 942 (P.C. 1969) (Malaysia). See also Nakkuda Ali v. Jayaratne, [19511 A.C. 66,
76-77 (P.C. 1950) (Ceylon); LaFave, supra note 17, at 73-74.
20. It is only in recent years that hearsay evidence has been deemed permissible. Compare
Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124, 128 (1932) (dictum), with Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 174 n.13 (1949). See also Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-71 (1960). English
courts have permitted reasonably reliable hearsay to be used for more than a century. See Lister
v. Perryman, L.R. 4 H.L. 521, 530-33 (1870).
21. Cf. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
1975]
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inference which is reasonably probable.2 2 The important thing to note
about the probable cause requirement is that it ordinarily applies to all
governmental searches and seizures and that generally the burden is
greater where the governmental conduct is more intrusive. 23
The burden of proof required in probable cause inquiries cannot
be calculated with exactitude. The evidence must give rise to more
than "suspicion" but it need not match the degree of probity required
in civil trials.2 4 It is important to note that the burden is flexible. It
may be increased or reduced in different situations, and to further
specific policies. Thus, in order to encourage police to obtain warrants,
the United States Supreme Court has declared that closer scrutiny will
be made of a police officer's determination of probable cause than that
of a magistrate based on the same evidence. 2- The burden of proof
may be high where the police activity sought to be justified is a
"no-knock" arrest entry, 26 a night-time arrest 27 or a border search of
intimate body areas. 28 Conversely, the burden may be lower for pro-
tective searches for weapons2 9 or English detentions for search,30 than
that for arrest. The burden is placed at a very low level for administra-
22. Cf. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); see Shaaban Bin Hussien v. Chong
Fook Kam, [1970] A.C. 942, 949 (P.C. 1969) (Malaysia).
23. Compare Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), with Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S.
30 (1970).
[Slearches for evidence of crime will inevitably violate the civil liberties of the innocent
as well as the guilty. The proportion of innocent who suffer, to guilty whose crimes are
detected, will be a function of the quality of pre-search information required. In setting
the standards of probable cause, an assessment must be made of the degree to which
innocent men will suffer from mistaken searches.
Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment, 28 U.
CHI. L. REV. 664, 701 (1961).
24. The law requires different degrees of probity for different purposes. The probable cause
burden of proof is well below the standard for a finding of guilty used in criminal trials ("beyond
reasonable doubt") and below that used in civil trials ("preponderance of the evidence"), but
above that which gives rise to suspicion, i.e., evidence consistent with a particular conclusion but
insufficient to lead a reasonable man to that inference. "Supicion in its ordinary meaning is a state
of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking: 'I suspect but cannot prove.' " Shaaban Bin
Hussien v. Chong Fook Kam, [1970] A.C. 942, 948 (P.C. 1969) (Malaysia). Probable cause does
not require prima facie proof of guilt. Id. The burden for probable cause seems to be higher than
the standard employed for judicial review of administrative decisions ("substantial evidence") and
well above that used in the United States for judicial review of legislative economic regulation
("rational basis"), but it seems well below that used for judicial review of discriminatory
legislation. In the United States, because of the impact of a seizure of allegedly obscene materials
as a prior restraint on expression violative of the first amendment, in order to seize such materials
a constitutionally sufficient judicial warrant is required. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496
(1973). This requirement does not elevate the necessary degree of proof, but rather places a higher
procedural burden on the government.
25. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-07 (1965). At times a police officer's
determination alone is perforce insufficient. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973).
26. Note, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 156 (1970).
27. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. Note, 78 VALE L.J. 433, 439 n.31 (1969).
29. LaFave, supra note 17, at 53-54.
30. Williams, Statutory Powers of Search and Arrest on the Ground of Unlawful Possession,
1960 CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 598, 606 [hereinafter cited as Williams, Statutory Powers]. This police
practice has not yet received judicial approval.
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tive housing inspections, particularly of business premises. 3' It has
also been suggested that the burden may be lowered when the gravity
of the crime is great.3 2 Although there are numerous instances of
"variable probable cause," 33 there are dangers of misuse of this
technique. The wisdom of applying lower standards to the issuance of
arrest warrants than to the issuance of search warrants is question-
able at best.3 4 Both warrants should be based on the same level of
evidence since both can result in broad search powers.
2. RELIABILITY OF EVIDENCE
Intimately related to the requirement of probable cause is the
requirement that the evidence used be reasonably reliable. 3 5 When the
determination of probable cause to search is being made by a judicial
officer pursuant to a warrant procedure (that is, when a magistrate
determines the justification for a search before it is instituted as op-
posed to reviewing the propriety of a police search after it has occur-
red), reliability is provided for by requiring testimony under oath or
affirmation. When hearsay evidence is used, the circumstantial basis
underlying any conclusory allegations of fact must be revealed in order
to demonstrate a reason for crediting the hearsay. 36 When testimony is
based on information supplied by an undisclosed or non-testifying
informant, it is generally required that the informant have dem-
onstrated reliability in the past and that there be corroborative
evidence from other sources. 37 Similar safeguards are being required
with increasing frequency when the determination of probable cause to
31. Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: The Developing Role of the Search Warrant,
42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1119, 1120, 1125-26 (1967).
32. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 119 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TIFFANY]; W.R. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO
CUSTODY 246-50 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LAFAVE]. Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 183 (1949); (Jackson, J., dissenting).
33. See the authorities collected in LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 54 n.74.
34. This seems to be the judicial practice, at least in the United States. See LaFave &
Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement
Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 993 (1965) [hereinafter cited as LaFave & Remington].
35. See Lister v. Perryman, L.R. 4 H.L. 521 (1870).
36. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269-71 (1960). It is also said that the reason for
this requirement is to enable the magistrate to make an independent conclusion and thus promote
the judicial character of the warrant. Giordanello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Nathan-
son v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1932). A magistrate may, however, use his personal knowledge
in reaching the decision whether to issue the warrant. Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
37. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959). Much of the judicial disfavor of informants' testimony probably can be traced to the
widespread use'of rewards in criminal law enforcement. See 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF
ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 57-155 (1957). Yet the protections afforded by requiring demonstration
of past reliability and independent investigative corroboration of informant information are not
anachronistic because the temptations presented by payment for information remain. Since the
use of compensated informants tan be expected to continue, maintenance of the corroboration
requirement seems advisable. Corroborative evidence may be supplied by personal knowledge of
the police investigator himself. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971). Additionally,
requirements of self-protection may justify a limited search for weapons during the corroboration
process itself. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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search or seize is made by the police. Although police have discretion 38
in making the determination whether an individual should be arrested,
they are expected to consider the reliability of evidence upon which
they base their determination of probable cause. 39 The corroboration
requirement as applied to the police, however, is less strict than that
applied to magistrates. 40
3. PARTICULARITY
The third libertarian requirement of search and seizure, and by
far the most complex and unrefined, is that which limits police search
and seizure to defined circumstances and particular objectives. The
factual circumstances of police search vary depending upon the focus
of the information-gathering activity. The police activity may consti-
tute surveillance, an unfocused general search such as a roadblock, a
focused search such as that of a room for a specific item of evidence,
or an analysis such as a test of the alcohol content of a suspect's blood.
The factual circumstances also vary, depending upon whether a sei-
zure of a person or thing precedes or follows the search, and sometimes
also upon whether an automobile or electronic device is involved.
Analysis of these diverse factual circumstances requires categorization
of the circumstances into a relatively organized conceptual framework
in order to understand when police search or seizure is permissible.
Then it is necessary to inquire whether in the circumstances of a
particular search a judicial warrant is required. The general principles
that emerge to guide this analysis are that searches and seizures
conducted without rational objectives are arbitrary; that the scope of a
search is to be limited to action necessary to effect the objective for
which it was instituted; and that prior judicial approval through a
warrant is to be obtained if possible. Yet there is such an infinite
variety of factual circumstances of search and seizure that categoriza-
tion often becomes a question of degree, and in assessing whether a
warrant is to be required in a particular instance, differences in prac-
ticability and convenience may obscure a disagreement with the pre-
mise that warrants are desirable.
B. Judicial Warrants
1. CHARACTERISTICS AND FUNCTIONS
In order to determine whether warrants are required for particu-
lar police searches and seizures, it is useful to examine the characteris-
38. Two hundred years ago police had a duty to arrest for felony at the request of a private
citizen. Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780). "[Ulnder the present law the police have
no special privilege in trusting the allegation of a third person." Williams, Arrest for Felony at
Common Law, 1954 CRIM. L. REV. (Eng.) 408, 412 [hereinafter cited as Williams, Arrest for
Felony].
39. See Note, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566,
576-77 (1936); Williams, supra note 38, LAFAVE, supra note 32, at 265-99 (1965).
40. See generally, LaFave, supra note 17, at 76-84.
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tics and functions of warrants and to differentiate between search and
arrest warrants. A warrant in the police context is a written order
issued in the name of the state by a judicial officer directing the
recipient or class of recipients of the order to search some specified
location for particular personal property4' or to arrest a certain person,
and to bring the person or property before the court. 42 The function of
the warrant is twofold: to provide a measure of judicial control over
police activity before trial, and to provide a measure of protection for
police from civil liability for conducting investigations. 43 Of the two
functions, the first is by far the more important.
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE
The reasons supporting the warrant's function of providing judi-
cial control over police action lie in the history of the use of warrants,
most significantly that of the search warrant, and the historic relation-
ship between the judiciary and the police. Initially search warrants
were used to enforce the law with respect to religious and political
crimes, as well as for ordinary law enforcement purposes. A great deal
is known about the use of warrants for religious and political purposes,
particularly about eighteenth century practices. Little is known of the
use of common law search warrants to enforce laws against secular,
nonpolitical crimes, except that such warrants at first were issued,
apart from statutory authority, only to search for stolen property. 44
This history of the growth of the common law search Warrant indicates
41. Warrants may be used for different purposes than searching for property and by
governmental officials other than police. For example, warrants may be employed to authorize
police wiretapping or electronic surveillance, or to authorize municipal inspectors to search
buildings for health hazards. Depending upon the purpose and circumstances, different degrees of
specificity may be required. See Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of
Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1465, 1491-92 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Note] .
42. Due to the explicit language of the fourth amendment, American warrants must very
specifically identify the object of the search or seizure. English practice is considerably less
stringent and English warrants may be unspecific in a manner which would be unconstitutional
in the United States. An English warrant usually
will specify the premises which are to be searched. It may also mention the thing (or
person) which is the object of the search, but the tendency in more modern provisions is
to avoid a requirement to specify what objects may be seized. The warrant is thus
effectively an authority to enter and search the premises, and the person executing the
warrant is empowered to seize items which he reasonably believes to be relevant to the
particular offence concerned.
Thomas, supra note 6, at 6 (emphasis added). Such discretion is constitutionally impermissible in
the United States.
43. Police at one time had protection from civil liability when acting pursuant to the order of
a private citizen to arrest a person. Samuel v. Payne, 99 Eng. Rep. 230 (K.B. 1780). This
immunity no longer exists because police have discretion in the matter. See Note, Legal and
Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 576-77 (1936); Williams,
supra note 38, at 412. They are immune from civil liability for executing warrants. Constables'
Protection Act of 1750. Police do not have discretion in executing warrants, and it may even be a
criminal offense to refuse to execute a valid warrant. Thus the warrant serves to delimit the
sphere of police immunity.
44. See Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States
and Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 499, 503-04 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Blakey]; Wade,
Police Search, 50 L.Q. REV. 354, 357 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Wade].
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that it developed as a means of controlling and instructing constables
in criminal investigation, for which justices of the peace were respon-
sible, where the justices themselves, were unable to supervise the
investigation directly. The warrant appears to have developed as a
written order to a subordinate for the purpose of giving instructions
and guidance on occasions where the more educated superior was
absent or unable to give personal direction. 45
The United States Supreme Court has maintained in numerous
cases over the past few decades that the purpose of the warrant was to
interpose a neutral magistrate between zealous investigators and the
citizenry. This reasoning has been carried to its logical limits in a case
which held that the warrant-issuing authority must be a judicial officer
unconnected with the investigation of the crime to which the warrant
relates.4 6 This theory as to the purpose of a warrant is an historical
myth, since until the mid-nineteenth century justices of the peace
combined judicial and criminal investigatory responsibilities. 47 It was
not until the creation of a separate police organization in the
nineteenth century that it was possible to separate the combined crim-
inal investigatory and judicial powers which the justices exercised
during the period in which they developed the common law search
warrant. With the rise of a separate police organization there was a
concomitant increase in police training and ability, with a correspond-
ing decrease in the original educative and instructive purpose of the
warrant. This led to the anomaly of trained police regarding warrants
as an inconvenient hindrance to their efficient functioning while war-
rants were expanding police authority to deal with an increasingly
wider range of crimes beyond simple theft.
3. VALUE
Although the interposition of neutrality was not originally a pur-
pose of the warrant, the magistrate's detached influence can provide a
salutary reason for retention of the warrant system.The warrant sys-
tem has survived as one manifestation of the need for some form of
judicial control over police activity. This need stems from the intimate
45. Travel in medieval England was hazardous and difficult even within the relatively small
jurisdictions of the justices. Thus the warrant provided a means of limiting the necessity of such
travel by the justices by giving instructions to the constable. The warrant incidentally served as
evidence of authority beyond that of the symbolic staff or baton.
46. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); See LaFave & Remington, supra note
34, at 991. Under certain circumstances even a court clerk may qualify. Shadwick v. City of
Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972). See generally Annot., 32 L. Ed. 2d 970 (1972). English practice is
quite different, in that senior police officers are empowered by some statutes to issue authoriza-
tions to search. See J. D. DEVLIN, POLICE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATION AND ORGANIZATION
340-41 (1966) [hereinafter cited as DEVLIN, Police Procedure]. Police officers are similarly
empowered to issue search authorizations in Australia. See Pearce, Judicial Review of Search
Warrants and the Maxwell Newton Case, 44 Aus. L.J. 467, 467-68 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Pearce].
47. Analysis of this theory is treated in more detail in Appendix A.
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relationship between the police who today investigate and prosecute
crime48 and the judiciary who ultimately control the trial and sentenc-
ing of violators. Judges have found that control of the fairness of a
trial requires some supervision over police conduct beforehand, and
the warrant today is an aid to that control. 4 9 A parallel can thus be
drawn between the warrant and judicial instructions regarding inter-
rogation by the police. 50
While the warrant affords invaluable theoretical protection
against unlawful searches, in practice it often provides no such protec-
tion. In many instances the issuance of a warrant is a routine, pro
forma process.5 1 Perhaps because of its adversary nature, there ap-
pears to be much more rigorous examination of warrants in hearings to
suppress their fruits than at the time of issuance itself; moreover,
sometimes judges quash warrants they themselves issued earlier.5 2
Perhaps judges tend toward less than desirable participation in war-
rant issuance decisions because they view the process as a ministerial
administrative task. At least to American police, judges often seem
more concerned with excluding evidence than preventing unlawful
searches.5 3 Certainly the warrant requires added, sometimes appar-
ently unnecessary work for both police and judges. If issued per-
functorily, the warrant may even provide less protection than that of
responsible and restrained law enforcement techniques employed by
conscientious police concerned with conducting valid searches.5 4 Yet
the warrant's inherent value seems to outweigh its practical deficien-
cies.
4. ARREST AND SEARCH WARRANTS
In the context of police search and seizure, there are two kinds of
warrants: the arrest warrant and the search warrant.5 5 Both warrants
serve to provide prior judicial approval of police activity, although in
48. English police assume a more important role in actual prosecution of crime than their
American counterparts. See KARLEN supra Note 6, at 19-29.
49. Requiring a warrant serves to eliminate the factor of hindsight operating to validate
unlawful but successful searches, as well as to remove excitement or prejudice from the decision
of whether a search should be made. See note, supra note 41, at 1469.
50. In England, control is effected through the Judges' Rules. See G. ABRAHAMS, POLICE
QUESTIONING AND THE JUDGES' RULES (1964). In the United States control has been through
judicial decisions culminating in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See generally KAR-
LEN, supra note 6, at 121-29.
5 1. See Note, Permissible Search of Premises Incidental to a Lawful Arrest, 43 TEMPLE
L.Q. 180, 187-88 (1970); See also notes 56 and 89 infra.
52. LaFave & Remington, supra note 34, at 994-95.
53. Id.
54. See Note, supra note 41, at 1471 n. 29; Note, Limiting the Permissible Scope of Search
Incident to an Arrest, 15 VILL. L. REV. 242, 247 (1969).
55. Absent police complicity in their execution, administrative warrants such as those to
inspect for compliance with fire regulations are thus excluded. Warrants authorizing police
wiretapping and electronic surveillance are a modified form of search warrant. Cf. Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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practice the search warrant is far more important to this function.5 6
The important difference between the two warrants lies in the differ-
ent premises, established by evidence of probable cause, which are
needed to support the conclusion that a search or arrest warrant
should issue. The conclusion that an arrest warrant should issue is
based on two premises: 1) that a particular crime has been committed;
and 2) that a particular person committed that crime. The lawfulness
of the conclusion that a search warrant should issue requires that three
premises be satisfactorily established: 1) that a particular crime has
been committed; 2) that certain items are connected with that crime;
and 3) that those items are presently located in a particular place. 57 "In
the case of arrest, the conclusion concerns the guilt of the arrestee,
whereas in the case of search warrants, the conclusions go to the
connection of the items sought with crime and to their present loca-
tion." 58
This analysis thus discloses that the two types of police warrants
differ significantly in one regard: for a search warrant to issue there
must be proof that the items sought are presently located in a particu-
lar place, while an arrest warrant may be issued regardless of proof of
the present location of the fugitive.5 9 In fact, arrest warrants are
commonly issued when the whereabouts of the subject are unknown.
Implicit in the difference between the two warrants is the assumption
that the search for persons and the search for things involve different
considerations. When it is considered that a search for a person may
precede his arrest, it is thus apparent that in relationship to the
warrant procedure, the search for a person is not subject to the same
prior judicial approval and control as that of a search for things. The
reasons that the concept of prior judicial approval is not applied to
such searches become more apparent when such matters as searches
56. Most arrests are made without a warrant. Felony arrest warrants, in the relatively rare
circumstances where they are sought, usually are obtained for administrative purposes such as to
provide a memorandum of the decision to arrest a fugitive. Even when affidavits supporting the
request are sought, judges pay scant attention to them. See note 89 infra. For lesser offenses it
may be possible to use the citation, a written notice to appear in court at a stated time and place
to answer an offense charged in the citation. Although ordinarily employed in traffic violation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be used for other lesser offenses. It saves significant police
time and expense and unnecessary citizen indignity.
57. An administrative warrant would be based essentially upon two premises: 1) that there
is a given relationship between locations with certain characteristics and likelihood of violation of
particular regulations; and 2) that a particular location has those characteristics. Cf. Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). Similarly, a police warrant used to authorize interception
of wire communications would essentially be based upon three premises: 1) that a certain offense
has been, is being or is about to be committed; 2) that communications regarding that offense are
probable; and 3) that those communications probably will occur by use of a particular facility
during a certain time.
58. Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amend-
ment, 28 U. CHi. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961).
59. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
There appears to be no problem in executing either warrant at night. See Gooding v. United
States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974).
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT
for persons and arrests of persons are properly viewed within the
perspective of the entire process of police search and seizure.
C. Search Objectives and Focus
1. CATEGORIES OF POLICE SEARCH ACTIVITY
Conceptually, the process of police search and seizure is primarily
a matter of focus. It is the presence or absence of certain objectives
and purposes in a particular police information gathering activity that
distinguishes permissible police surveillance and searching from im-
permissible general searches. Ordinary police surveillance is a monitor-
ing of public activity to detect crime, through which the police observe
events occurring around them without concentrated regard for events
at a particular place or of a particular nature. General searches,
however, are characterized by an imbalanced absence of particularity.
The police searching activity may be focused upon a particular loca-
tion but not the commission of a particular offense. Such searches are
sometimes referred to as "fishing expeditions." On the other hand, the
search may be for a particular object or offender but in an unspecified
location as in a search by use of a roadblock or a house to house
canvass. Permissible surveillance by the police is observation con-
ducted by the police in the role of ordinary citizen, while searching
involves some activity going beyond dutiful curiosity to a more definite
and active inquiry. To be sure, the distinction between surveillance
and search is often a question of degree which may depend upon some
specific, perhaps ludicrous refinements, 60 and the terms themselves are
not capable of satisfactorily accurate definition. The broad categories
are separable, however, and the law is accustomed to dealing with
questions of degree.
Just as the broad categories of surveillance and general search are
separable from each other and from the familiar police search of a
limited area for a relatively specific object, it is analytically possible to
separate this latter category into distinct factual patterns. This further
categorization of police search and seizure involves the focus, or the
objectives and purposes, of particular searches. It also involves the
relationship in time between the search and the seizure or immobiliza-
tion of the object sought.
2. FOCUSED POLICE SEARCH
Focused police search typically has a definite piece of evidence as
its object; when the article is located and its legal custody is effected
60. For example, does permissible surveillance include viewing toilet stalls through vents or
pipes in ceilings or from adjacent stalls to detect acts of homosexuality? See Smayda v. United
States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965); Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 371 P.2d 288, 21 Cal. Rptr. 551
(1962). The factor separating a surveillance from a search often is whether the police committed a
trespass in gathering information. See United States v. Strickland, 62 F. Supp. 468 (W.D.S.C.
1945).
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through seizure- or immobilization, the search ends. For example,
police may go to the house of an accused with a warrant to search for
three stolen television sets of a particular make and model, find three
such sets in the living room, and seize them. At this point, theoreti-
cally, the search terminates and the police must go; the warrant has
been executed and purpose of the search realized. Police search is a
process, however, and more may be involved. It may be that the
seized article is subjected to further search or analysis, the object of
which is discovery of an item or characteristic which such evidence
contains. For example, police may go to the house of the accused with
a warrant to search for counterfeit currency. They may find a stack of
currency in a drawer in the bedroom, but its seizure does not end the
searching activity. The bills or banknotes are then taken by the police
to their laboratories where they are subjected to various tests to
determine whether they are in fact counterfeit.
This example illustrates that police searching activity may follow
as well as precede a seizure of a particular item, and that a search may
have as its purpose not merely the seizure of a particular item but
additional analysis of the item to obtain further information. 61 This
distinction between search and analysis, taking into account as it does
the time at which an item is seized or immobilized and the essential
purpose of the searching activity, provides a convenient factual refer-
ence point from which one can study the search and seizure process. It
permits the study of police searches preceding seizure, based upon the
object of the search. 62 It also permits the study of circumstances in
which analysis follows a seizure, or a seizure is effected without a
search, or a seizure or immobilization is effected so that an analysis
may be performed. These circumstances include the major categories
of police search and seizure activity. 63
This method of conceptual analysis is helpful in determining what
factors influence the determination whether a judicial warrant is re-
quired in a particular circumstance. The factors can be classed as 1)
those affecting the potentiality that the purpose of the search or seizure
will be frustrated (by possible destruction or removal of the object or by
resistance to the governmental officer) and 2) those affecting pro-
cedural convenience. The first class of factors permit dispensing with
obtaining a warrant when this is necessary to law enforcement. These
61. This latter distinction has little significance in the counterfeiting example given, but such
subsequent searching activity can involve items to which considerable interest in privacy may
attach, as for example a diary. Also, subsequent search may be applied to intimate areas of the
human person, in which case the invasion of privacy will be serious.
62. The object of any search can be a human being, an animate object, an inanimate
physical object, or an intangible object such as conversation, although police are rarely concerned
with searches for animate objects such as wild animals.
63. At times there may also be police involvement in searches of a normally administrative
character, such as those to enforce fire prevention, health, immigration and tax laws. See, e.g.,
Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960).
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are relatively apparent and well settled. The latter class operates to
permit dispensing with obtaining a warrant because it is convenient
but not necessary to do so. The operation of this class is by no means
always apparent or well settled, because its subtle influence involves
the normative and philosophical question whether warrants are de-
sirable.
This method of analysis is also helpful in identifying those indi-
vidual interests which are most affected by particular search or seizure
activity. The search and seizure process generally affects two classes of
interests: those in privacy and those in freedom of person or property.
As a general statement, the material impact of search is interference
with privacy, while the essential effect of seizure is interference with
personal liberty or possession of property. Particular search and sei-
zure activity may have a greater effect on one class of interests than
the other, although courts may be reluctant to make any such distinc-
tion. 64 The type of interest affected matters very little in determining
whether warrants are required, the question depending more upon the
effect of the factors of necessity and convenience discussed above.
There is, however, a tendency in the United States to impose a stricter
warrant requirement where privacy of a very intimate nature is in-
volved. Thus greater legal restrictions may attach to a search of a
dwelling house than to a search of an open field, or to an intrusive
probing of intimate areas of the body6 5 than to a frisk of outer
garments. This may be due to the nature of the rights involved.
Interference with liberty of the person or possession of property is
easily translatable into money damages in terms familiar to the law.
The seizure of a person is subject to immediate review before a
magistrate. Privacy, however, may be lost irretrievably, and calcula-
tion of the loss in terms of money may be difficult.
III. SEARCHES FOR HUMAN BEINGS
A. General Considerations
A type of police search which, except for recent developments in
the United States, has developed virtually free of warrant restrictions is
the search for a human being for the purpose of making a criminal
arrest. 66 Although an arrest warrant may be. necessary in order to
64. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52 (1970).
65. In the same vein, police try to avoid impropriety in searches of female prisoners. See
TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 142-43.
66. See generally, Note, The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23
STAN. L. REV. 995 (1971). This discussion does not include arrest under civil process which, since
abolishment of the imprisonment for debt, seems in practice limited to certain cases of contempt.
For a civil arrest it was illegal to break into a dwelling. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng.
Rep. 194 (1603). Neither does this discussion include arrest of insane persons dangerous to
themselves or others. See, e.g., Anderson v. Burrows, 4 Car. & P. 210, 172 Eng. Rep. 674 (1830);
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 1 El. & El. 420, 120 Eng. Rep. 967 (1859); Cook v. Highland Hosp., 168
N.C. 250, 84 S.E. 352 (1915). Also excluded are arrests of political criminals.
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make the arrest, once the power to arrest arises there are very few
restrictions upon where and how the police (and to a degree also
private citizens) 67 may search without a search warrant to make the
arrest. Generally, a person attempting to make an arrest for a serious
crime may without a search warrant search any place at which there is
probable cause to believe the person sought is located. Forcible entry
to search may be permitted as well. Only in the past few decades in
the United States has there begun a movement to limit this power of
search by relating it to the judicial warrant requirement. Recent deci-
sions indicate that searches for persons subject to arrest cannot be
conducted without an arrest warrant, and possibly a search warrant,
unless "exigent circumstances" so require.
B. Powers of Arrest
A degree of prior judicial control over arrests for minor crimes
exists by virtue of the arrest warrant. Although there is a significant
variation between police powers of arrest without a warrant at com-
mon law and under statutes in England and the United States, police
generally may arrest without a warrant for serious crimes but not for
minor ones. Basically, at common law a police officer could arrest
upon reasonable suspicion of felony and for misdemeanors involving a
breach of the peace committed in the officer's presence. 68 Most Ameri-
can states expanded these powers to permit police arrest for any
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, whether or not a
breach of the peace was involved. In most states also, "felony" was
statutorily defined to include crimes for which the punishment includes
imprisonment for some period such as a year. 6 9 England recently
abolished the distinction between felony and misdemeanor, providing
for summary arrest for "arrestable offences" for which the sentence is
fixed by law or for which a first offender could be sentenced to five
years' imprisonment (including attempts to commit such offenses). 70 In
both countries treason is treated as a major crime for which there may
be summary arrest. Both countries also permit civil officers to arrest a
deserter from the armed forces.,7 1 although no such power existed at
67. The arrest powers of police and private citizens are very similar, although arrests by
laymen are not common. The major difference is that private persons act at their peril in
arresting for crimes not actually committed. See Criminal Law Act of 1967, c. 58, § 2; Walters v.
W. H. Smith & Son, Ltd., [1914] 1 K. B. 595. See also Begley v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. 1546,
60 S.W. 847 (1901).
68. See generally Perkins, The Law of Arrest, 25 IOWA L. REV. 201 (1940); Wilgus, Arrest
Without a Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REV. 541 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Wilgus); Williams, supra
note 38.
69. See Remington, The Law Relating to "On the Street" Detention, Questioning and
Frisking of Suspected Persons and Police Arrest Privileges in General, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
386, 388-89 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Remington].
70. Criminal Law Act of 1967, c. 58, §§ 1-2. See Stephens, Search and Seizure of Chattels,
1970 CRIM. L. REV. 74, 76-77 [hereinafter cited as Stephens].
71. 10 U.S.C. § 808 (1956); 33 Halsbury's Laws of England § 1442 (3d ed. 1961). England
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common law. 72 Thus, both countries statutorily provide for summary
arrest for major crimes. Where there is no power of summary arrest,
arrest may only be made pursuant to an arrest warrant.
C. Nonconsensual Search Entry
Both a summary arrest and one pursuant to a warrant create little
difficulty where the person to be arrested is readily available, and the
arrest may be effected without any search to locate him. Unfortunately
not all arrests are as simple, and it is often necessary to search for the
person to be seized. It may be necessary to extend the search to private
property such as a dwelling, and to use some degree of force.
1. IN THE UNITED STATES
"The question of the scope of search and seizure once the police
are on the premises would appear to be subsidiary to the basic issue of
when intrusion is permissible. ' 73 Surprisingly enough, the question of
when police may enter upon a person's premises without judicial
approval has not often been litigated. The Supreme Court has not yet
authoritatively decided the
grave constitutional question, namely whether the forceful
nighttime entry into a dwelling to arrest a person reasonably
believed within, upon probable cause that he had committed
a felony, under circumstances where no reason appears why
an arrest warrant could not have been sought, is consistent
with the Fourth Amendment.7 4
It seems clear, however, that in the United States the lawfulness of a
forcible search of a dwelling in order to make an arrest requires, as a
minimum, that three conditions be reliably fulfilled by evidence
amounting to probable cause. There must be sufficient grounds
reasonably to believe that a crime has been committed, that the person
sought is implicated in the crime, and that the person sought is located
in the place to be searched. There are two significant problems in fully
applying the judicial warrant requirement to the determination of
whether these conditions have been satisfactorily established.
The first problem is whether an arrest warrant is to be required
in order forcibly to search a dwelling to make an arrest, even when
summary arrest powers exist, where no circumstances make an im-
mediate search and arrest necessary. Requiring a judicial warrant
provides for prior judicial determination of the first two conditions-
permits this latter power to be exercised by private citizens where no constable is available and
applies it as well to apprehension of absentees without leave.
72. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
73. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S, 443, 475 (1971).
74. Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1957). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443 (1971) (question again left open). An indication of how the Supreme Court might
decide the question may be gleaned from Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974), where
nocturnal execution of a search warrant was approved.
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that the person sought is implicated in a crime which has already been
committed.
The second problem is whether some form of search warrant is
necessary for such forcible searches where no circumstances exist mak-
ing an immediate search and arrest necessary. Requiring such a war-
rant would provide for prior judicial determination of the third condi-
tion to the lawfulness of the search-that there are reasonable grounds
to believe the person sought is located at the place to be searched.
In recent years American courts have come to grips with the
problem of applying the judicial warrant to arrest entries. An arrest
warrant is a prerequisite to the lawfulness of forcible police entry into
private premises to search for the person to be arrested unless the
circumstances require an immediate search and arrest. Recognizing
that the fourth amendment applies to arrest entries, 75 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently held in Dorman v.
United States76 that the police cannot without consent or a judicial
warrant enter private premises to arrest a suspected felon in the
absence of "exigent circumstances."
Without excluding the possibility of other "exceptions" the
court went on to articulate some of the elements relevant in
determining whether "exigent circumstances" exist in a par-
ticular case: (1) whether a serious offense, particularly a
crime of violence, is involved; (2) whether the suspect is
reasonably believed to be armed; (3) whether there is a clear
showing of probable cause; (4) whether strong reason exists to
believe the suspect is in the premises being entered; (5)
whether there is a likelihood that the suspect will escape if
not swiftly apprehended; (6) whether the entry is forcible or
peaceful; and (7) whether the entry is at night . . .77
Warrantless arrest entries are also permitted when the entry is made in
immediate pursuit of the suspect 78 or as part of the immediate cir-
cumstances surrounding a crime recently committed or in the process
of being committed. 79 Other cases indicate that the imminent destruc-
tion of material evidence may provide sufficient justification.8 0 Con-
75. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967).
76. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Dorman seems to have been met with approval in the
other circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Phillips, 497 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1974); Fisher v. Volz,
496 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Shye, 492 F.2d 886 (6th Cir. 1974).
77. Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984, 990 (4th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986 (1971).
78. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
79. E.g., Washington v. United States, 263 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Smith v. United
States, 254 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); Ellison v. United States,
206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States, 183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340
U.S. 904 (1950). See also United States v. Syler, 430 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1970).
80. Kleinbart v. United States, 439 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Smith v. United States, 254
F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 937 (1958); Hailes v. United States, 267 F.2d
363 (D.C. Cir. 1970). See Note, supra note 41, at 1489.
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sent to the entry may be readily implied from the circumstances, 8 1 as
where the entry is made to render aid to a person believed to be in
distress.
82
This area of the law is not well settled. In the first place, the
recent developments have been primarily centered around the District
of Columbia Circuit, and earlier decisions, even in that circuit, have
conflicted with the broad language of Dorman v. United States.83
Also, no case has held that a search warrant may be necessary to
search a particular location for a person subject to arrest when there is
outstanding a valid warrant for his arrest. 84 While Dorman indicates
that some form of a search warrant, as well as an arrest warrant, may
be necessary,8 5 other courts have stated that "the issuance of an
arrest warrant is itself an exceptional circumstance obviating the need
for a search warrant. '86 Even an invalid arrest warrant may suffice.8 7
Thus although Dorman provides for prior judicial determination
of the first two conditions for the lawfulness of arrest entries, the third
condition, that the person be located at the place to be searched, may
not be subject to prior approval. Indeed, even Dorman lists "strong
reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered" 88 as
an exception justifying entry, thus indicating that an increased police
burden to establish the third condition for probable cause may be an
acceptable alternative to a judicial search warrant. 89 The solution to
81. Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
82. People v. Henning, 96 Cal. Rptr. 294 (Ct. App. 1971).
83. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Compare, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 262 F.2d 449
(D.C. Cir. 1958), with Williams v. United States, 273 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S, 951 (1960); Ellison v. United States, 206 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Martin v. United States,
183 F.2d 436 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 904 (1950); Love v. United States, 170 F.2d
32 (4th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 912 (1949).
84. Indeed, Mr. Justice White apparently believes that a warrantless entry for the purpose of
arrest is reasonable regardless of the circumstances so long as there is probable cause. See Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 776-80 (1969) (White, J., dissenting).
85. The Dorman decision recognized that a search was involved and that there is a general
requirement for some form of warrant in order to enter a house without consent to search for a
person subject to arrest. 435 F.2d at 388-91. Also, the decision relied heavily upon Morrison v.
United States, 262 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1958), which held that "officers without a warrant cannot
enter, even without actually breaking, a private dwelling to search for a suspected felon, no
permission being given and no circumstances of necessitous haste being present." 262 F.2d at
454. Other decisions have indicated some form of combined warrant may be used. United States
v. Free, 437 F.2d 631, 635 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
86. United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 263 (6th Cir. 1967). See also Lankford v.
Schmidt, 240 F. Supp. 550, 560-61 (D. Md. 1965), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966).
87. United States v. Wright, 432 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 966
(1971); Vance v. North Carolina, 432 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1970); Pineda v. Craven, 327 F. Supp.
1062 (N.D. Cal. 1971). But see Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
88. 435 F.2d at 393.
89. Cf. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106-107 (1965). Increasing the police
burden of probable cause may be a far more satisfactory resolution of this problem.
Arrest warrants are seldom obtained prior to arrest. Even when a warrant is obtained,
the objective of the police usually is not to acquire a judicial evaluation of the grounds
for arrest; rather, the warrant is sought as a bookkeeping device or to serve some other
administrative function.
LaFave & Remington, supra note 34, at 992. See also Remington, supra note 69, at 388.
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the second problem of applying the judicial warrant to police arrest
entries therefore may be simply to increase the burden of probable
cause for the third condition.
2. IN ENGLAND
English law apparently permits police forcibly to enter a dweliing
and to make an arrest whenever the power to make an immediate
arrest exists. 90 Thus, a constable may use force to enter private prop-
erty without a warrant and search to arrest for a felony which he
reasonably suspects has been, is being, or is about to be committed. 9'
Likewise he may make a forcible entry where a breach of the peace is
being committed 9 2 and even to prevent a breach of the peace from
being committed. 93 The constable may also make a forcible entry
when he is in fresh pursuit of a prisoner escaping from lawful arrest, 9 4
and similarly, "if the arrest is being evaded with the connivance of the
occupiers or landlords.19 5
A constable may also use force to enter a dwelling house to
execute a warrant of arrest. 96 The power permits entry not only of
dwellings but of other premises at which the person to be arrested is
reasonably believed to be located. 97 The sole limitations upon the
power to make a forcible entry to arrest, a power which necessarily
includes the power to search the premises for the person to be ar-
rested, 9 8 seem to be that an officer cannot break the outer door of the
90. "By statute, the police have power for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest to enter
(by force if need be) and search any place where the person to be arrested is or is reasonably
suspected to be." S. A. DESMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 458 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as DESMITH], citing Criminal Law Act of 1967, c. 58, § 2(6).
91. Davis v. Russell, 5 Bing. 354, 130 Eng. Rep. 1098 (1829); Handcock v. Baker, 2 B. & P.
260, 126 Eng. Rep. 1270 (1800). Entry cannot be made by a private person who merely suspects a
felony is about to be committed, and "a private person is not justified in his action if events prove
that he was mistaken in his belief that there was a felon in the building, even if his belief was
reasonable." DEVLIN, supra note 46, at 334.
92. DEVLIN, supra note 46, at 334; Waters, Public Rights of Entry, 11 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 132, 137 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Waters].
93. Thomas v. Sawkins, [1935] 2 K.B. 249.
94. Genner v. Sparkes, 1 Salk. 79, 91 Eng. Rep. 74 (1704); Anonymous, Lofft 390, 98 Eng.
Rep. 709 (1774). "If it is not immediate pursuit, however, entry may not be made without a
warrant of arrest, unless the prisoner is a felon." DEVLIN, Police Procedure, supra note 46, at
335. Even an initial breaking of an outer door to "recapture" an "escaped" prisoner who has been
touched through an open window is permitted. Anonymous, 7 Mod. 8, 87 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1702);
Sandon v. Jervis, El. B1. & El. 935, 120 Eng. Rep. 758 (1858).
95. Waters, supra note 92, at 137. This type of entry could possibly be justified upon some
theory of waiver.
96. In addition to arrests for ordinary crimes, the arrest warrant may be for contempt of
Parliament, Howard v. Gossett, Car. & M. 380, 174 Eng. Rep. 553 (1842); Burdett v. Colman,
14 East 163, 104 Eng. Rep. 563 (1811), and also for contempt of court, Harvey v. Harvey, 26 Ch.
D. 644 (1884).
97. R. v. Smith, 6 Car. & P. 136, 172 Eng. Rep. 1178 (1833). An American authority noted
that it does not matter whether the place to be searched is a dwelling house, a public building, a
church, a train or automobile, or even a court, but that "it should not be while court is in
session." Wilgus, supra note 68, at 558.
98. Some power of search is implicitly recognized in the decisions distinguishing between
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dwellifig house of a person to be arrested under civil process, 99 a
distinction of little current relevance, and that prior to a forcible entry,
notice of authority and purpose should be given and demand for entry
should have been refused.' 00 Even this latter provision can probably
be dispensed with if necessary for the safety of the arresting officer,' 0 '
"or if it is reasonable to think that announcing one's presence before
seizing him would cause him to run away from the scene."'
1 0 2
D. Historical Development of Searches for Human Beings
The historical development of this portion of the law of search,
like that of arrest generally, is "long, obsure, and technical."' 1 3 The
relative lack of prior judicial control over searches for human beings in
order to arrest can be partially ascribed to the early Anglo-Saxon
practice of "hue and cry," out of which our modern law of arrest was
developed. Under "hue and cry," as soon as the alarm was raised
that a crime had been committed, all persons within hearing of the call
had the duty of immediately joining in the chase for the criminal. The
authority for levying the "hue and cry" gradually shifted, in cases
where time permitted, to the constable and justice of the peace, and
judicial control over the determination of whether a particular indi-
vidual should be apprehended was instituted. Out of this grew the
practice of issuing arrest warrants. 104
Gradually the task of apprehending criminals also shifted to gov-
ernment agents, and although private persons still have authority to
apprehend criminals, the major responsibility for doing so is that of
the police. Because of the necessity for quick action, however, the type
of judicial control which magistrates were able to assert over the
breaking outer and inner doors, and those which discuss whether a search warrant is required.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246, 128 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1815); Smith v. Shirley, 3 C.B.
142, 136 Eng. Rep. 58 (1846).
99. Kerbey v. Denby, 1 M. & W. 336, 150 Eng. Rep. 463 (1836); Whalley v. Williamson, 7
Car. & P. 294, 173 Eng. Rep. 130 (1836); Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 537, 79 Eng. Rep. 1063 (1639).
An inner door may be broken in civil arrest cases only after a demand for admission. Ratcliffe v.
Burton, 3 B. & P. 223, 127 Eng. Rep. 123 (1802); Waterhouse v. Saltmarsh, Hob. 263, 80 Eng.
Rep. 409 (1619). But see Smith v. Butler, Comb. 326, 90 Eng. Rep. 507 (1724). Entry past the
outer door may be gained by subterfuge, however, R. v. Backhouse, Lofft 61, 98 Eng. Rep. 533
(1772), so long as it is not violent. Park v. Evans, Hob. 62, 80 Eng. Rep. 211 (1615). See also
United States v. Syler, 430 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1970) (entry by ruse). Apparently the outer door of
the premises of third parties may be broken so long as there are reasonable grounds to believe the
person to be arrested is hiding there. Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246, 128 Eng. Rep. 1029 (1815).
However, as in the case of private persons making an arrest, even a constable may act at his peril
if the person is not found. Morrish v. Murrey, 13 M. & W. 52, 153 Eng. Rep. 22 (1844).
100. Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1604). See also Ratcliffe v. Burton,
3 B. & P. 223, 127 Eng. Rep. 123 (1802); Launock v. Brown, 2 B. & A. 592, 106 Eng. Rep. 482
(1819).
101. Unannounced entry has been permitted where necessary in the United States. E.g., 18
U.S.C. § 3109 (1969). See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Blakey, supra note 44.
102. DESMITH, supra note 90, at 447.
103. Wilgus, supra note 68, at 545.
104. See CRITCHLEY, supra note 7, at 11-12; J. F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW OF ENGLAND 190 (1883).
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determination whether to arrest is in many instances impossible to
assert over the determination whether to search to effect the arrest.
The most decisive factor in precluding prior judicial approval appears
to be the volitional mobility of the fugitive. This factor poses the
possibility of escape where there is delay in capture, and necessitates
later judicial review of police action rather than prior judicial approv-
al.
IV. FOCUSED SEARCH FOR TANGIBLE AND INTANGIBLE OBJECTS
A. General Considerations
1. DISTINGUISHED FROM SEARCH FOR HUMAN BEINGS
Where the search is for a physical object rather than a human
being, there is less likelihood that the search will be frustrated by the
volitional mobility of the object of search. Although nonvolitional
mobility may affect some searches such as those involving an au-
tomobile, the frustration of an attempt to effect legal custody will
usually be due to some factor external to the object itself. 105 Generally
physical objects are passive and immobile, neutral and submissive.
Search for them, therefore, can more readily be subjected to prior
judicial approval. Delays involved in obtaining that approval are
tolerable so long as external factors do not operate to make frustration
of the attempt to effect legal custody likely unless there is an im-
mediate seizure.
2. THE JUDICIAL WARRANT
a. Susceptibility to the Warrant
The process of analyzing physical objects after their seizure is
another aspect of police searching activity which is susceptible to
direct judicial control through the warrant system. No general rule
requiring a warrant governs such searches, however. On the contrary,
courts have left this matter almost entirely to police discretion. Part of
the reason for this lack of judicial control lies in the slowness of legal
theory to recognize analysis following seizure as a separable aspect of
the process of police search for which rules must be formulated.
Attention to the individual interests primarily affected by search and
by analysis following seizure is, however, causing increasing concern
about the latter. Legal scholars are realizing that an analysis of seized
105. Some objects may have self-destructive characteristics which preclude delay in their
seizure. The alcoholic content of blood, for example, is reduced by natural body processes over a
period of time, and in order for the blood to be of use as evidence in a prosecution for intoxicated
driving, samples must be taken quickly. This factor of imminent self destruction is analogous to
volitional mobility: independently of external assistance both factors may operate to negate
effective seizure unless custody is effected without delay. Analogous necessity attaches to inter-
ception of oral communications. Unless there is an immediate, contemporaneous seizure, as by
recording, they are lost unless later described and related by a communicant.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT
property may be conducted so as to make the individual interest in
privacy paramount to those interests normally associated with ques-
tions of control over objects in one's possession. As a result, current
commentaries have begun to inquire when warrants should properly
be required for subsequent searches.106
b. Anglo-American Practices Generally
The process of search for and analysis of physical objects is that
aspect of police searching activity which is most susceptible to direct
judicial control through the warrant system. Therefore, control of this
type of -search has theoretical application to all such searches. The
general rule governing searches for physical objects is that a warrant
must be obtained prior to searching except in recognized circumstances
in which police for some designated reason may conduct an immediate
search. Indeed, the assumption most crucial to the theory of a warrant
system is that warrants have positive value and should not be dis-
pensed with absent a reason. 10 7 Undeviating adherence to this rule
and its assumption best characterizes the American law of search and
seizure as developed by the Supreme Court. The rule that a judicial
warrant is required save in exceptional circumstances is a recurrent
theme in all American search and seizure decisions, whether the activ-
ity involved is that of police or other governmental agents. The con-
trast between American preoccupation with the judicial warrant and
its haphazard use in England constitutes the most striking difference
between the two legal systems in regard to search and seizure.
A corollary to the assumption that warrants ordinarily should be
required, is that warrants should be dispensed with only to the extent
contemplated by the reason for so doing and that the scope of a
warrantless search should be defined by the reason which permits its
institution. Aside from this limitation, warrantless searches are con-
ducted without explicit guidelines, an undesirable result10 8 since the
lack of adequate guidelines allows more intensive and extensive
searches for reasons of convenience and expediency.
106. E.g., Batchelder, Use of Stomach Pump as Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 41 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 189 (1950) [hereinafter cited as Batchelder]; McIntyre & Chabraja, The
Intensive Search of a Suspect's Body and Clothing, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 18 (1967) [hereinaf-
ter cited as McIntyre & Chabraja]; Comment, Intrusive Border Searches-Is Judicial Control
Desirable?, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 276 (1966); Note, Evidence Forcibly Removed from Body Cavity
Admissible in Federal Court, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 565 (1958).
107. For a brief analysis of the value of prior judicial authorization to search, see Thomas,
supra note 6, at 6-7. Of course search warrants are not always constitutionally required and may
not violate zones of reasonable privacy. E.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.* 322 (1973).
108. As a consequence [of confusion and uncertainty in the law of search and
seizure] the police officer is frequently left without power to take necessary and reason-
able steps for investigation even of serious offences, and the legality of a course of action
is often difficult to ascertain in advance. As in the case of arrest, the obscurity and
complexity of the law are as harmful to the freedom of the individual as to efficient
investigation, as the citizen is seldom able to know his rights and thus to defend them.
Thomas, supra note 6, at 3.
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Another corollary to the assumption that warrants should not be
dispensed with unnecessarily is that warrants should authorize all
searches reasonably necessary to efficient criminal investigation. In the
absence of legal authority to search pursuant to a warrant, police
intent upon the efficient performance of their criminal investigatory
duties may be induced to search without one under the dangerous
reasoning that they advance the purpose of the law by breaking it. In
this important regard, English warrant provisions are sadly deficient.
Most American states provide for warrants to search for objects
connected with crime, such as contraband or fruits and instrumen-
talities of major crimes, and the trend is to permit warrants to be
issued to search for purely evidentiary material.109 In early English
common law, search warrants could be issued only for the discovery
and seizure of stolen property, I0 but statutes have widened their use.
Unfortunately there are in England more than 60 such statutes which,
while similar procedurally, apply to disparate substantive offenses. As
a result of this haphazard statutory treatment, "deficiencies and
anomalies in the law are numerous. The police have no power, nor can
they obtain warrants, to search for the body of a murder victim or to
seize a murder weapon or vehicle used in connection with a murder (or
in fact many other crimes).'' 1" There is a compelling need for sim-
plification and uniformity in the English law, 1 12 but considerable
forces, such as lethargy and parliamentary recalcitrance to providing
policemen with search powers which carry considerable political im-
plications, are militating against such a reform.'' 3 Since the general
availability of the warrant encourages conscientious policemen to ob-
tain them, it is to be hoped that some rational statutory reform will
eventually take place. This is essential to the successful functioning of
a warrant-based system of criminal investigation.
Along these same lines efforts need to be made, both in the United
States and in England, to simplify the procedure for obtaining war-
rants. There is much to be said for considering a system using elec-
tronic devices to speed up the application and issuance of warrants, a
possibility currently being studied in the United States. The fundamen-
tal difficulty with the judicial warrant is its inherent delay. '"4 Speed-
ing up the issuance procedure as a solution to the problem seems far
preferable to the withdrawal of the warrant-issuing authority from the
magistrate in favor of an administrative official, or to the elimination
109. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not permit federal search
warrants to be issued to search for "mere evidence," but this is not a constitutional restriction
binding upon the states. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); United States v. Lef-
kowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
110. Entick v. Carrington, 2 Wils. K.B. 274, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
111. Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, 705 (C.A.); Thomas, supra note 6, at 3.
112. Thomas, supra note 6, at 3-8.
113. Williams, supra note 13.
114. Thomas, supra note 6, at 8-9.
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of the requirement of specificity, which would render the warrant
system almost valueless.
English and American law are very similar in their regulation of
the search for and analysis of tangible and intangible objects, and the
seizure of objects without a search. Both countries theoretically adhere
to the initial presumption that judicial warrants are required before
police search is permissible, and both countries make search incident
to arrest the major exception to this principle. England, however, is
not as dedicated to the judicial warrant concept, and has altogether
failed to apply it to the search for intangibles through wiretaps and
electronic surveillance. 115 The two countries also have differing rules,
primarily based upon statutes, delineating permissible instances of
police seizure or immobilization of evidence for the purpose of search
or analysis. There may also be differences in the rules regarding the
permissibility of police seizures of crime connected objects when they
do not involve a search, although there are indications that any differ-
ences are minor. The law of the two countries governing the analysis
of evidence following seizure also seems to be similar, although gener-
ally confused and unsettled. Despite the similarities of the law of the
two countries, to an American observer the English law lacks clarity,
completeness and direction in comparison with its American counter-
part. Some reasons for this will be discussed after a brief comparison
of the substantive law of the two countries.
The general rule at common law was that searches were illegal
except where authorized by consent1 16 or by judicial warrants which
were issued only to search for stolen property. While this rule still
obtains in both England and United States, adherence to it is far
stricter in the United States, largely due to the influence of the fourth
amendment. In the United States warrants generally are required
whenever circumstances permit, even in cases of administrative
search1 17 or wiretapping and electronic surveillance.' 18 It is also neces-
115. Warrants by the Secretary of State, an executive rather than judicial officer, are used
instead.
116. Searches with consent are not discussed in this article. See, however, Note, supra note
2, at 446-48; Note, Third Party Consent to Search and Seizure, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (1966);
Note, Effective Consent to Search and Seizure, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 260 (1964). See also, Annot.,
36 L. Ed. 2d 1143 (1973). For recent cases, see United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
117. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See
Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521 (1968). In order to
provide for inspections under federal liquor and gun control legislation administrative inspections
without a warrant may be permissible, although not where forcible entry is involved. Compare
United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972), with Collonade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970).
118. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See Kitch, Katz v. United States: The
Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 133 [hereinafter cited as Kitch, Limits].
Wiretapping and electronic surveillance are now controlled by title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970), as discussed at part IV, B
infra. For recent cases construing the Act, see United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974);
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974);
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sary that the warrant be issued by a judicial officer. 1 9 In England the
application of the warrant requirement is less rigorous. Many statutes
extending powers of entry to administrative officers do not require a
warrant. 120 It is even possible for English nonjudicial officers to au-
thorize searches, 121 and the Home Secretary apparently has the power
to authorize Wiretapping. 122
B. Search for and Interception of Communications
1. LETTER COMMUNICATIONS
In both England and the United States the government has the
power to intercept letter and wire communications. In the United
States, however, such interception is recognized as a form of search
subject to judicial warrant requirements, whereas in England no such
judicial control exists. The fourth amendment protection against un-
reasonable searches and seizures extends to letters and sealed mail in
the custody of postal authorities, and thus a judicial warrant is required
to open such matter. 123 The protection extends only to first class mail
within the country,124 and there is power to seize illegally mailed mat-
ter, 125 but the warrant practice is firmly established. This is in contrast
to the English procedure of permitting mail to be examined by warrant
authorized by the Secretary of State. 126 In England the interception of
written communications is considered a prerogative right of the
Crown, or at least a long exercised power in the nature of a royal
prerogative power. 127 The suggestion that secretarial warrants should
be replaced by judicial warrants has apparently been rejected 28 de-
United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S.
41 (1972).
119. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
120. See Waters, Rights of Entry in Administrative Officers, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 79 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Waters, Rights of Entry].
121. See DEVLIN, Police Procedure, supra note 46, at 340-41. Under the Theft Act of 1968,
c. 60, § 26(2) a senior police officer may give a constable written authority to search premises of
certain types of prior offenders. See also Thomas, supra note 6, at 9-11.
122. See COMMITTEE OF PRIVY COUNCILLORS APPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE INTER-
CEPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS, FIRST REPORT, CMND. No. 283 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
REPORT].
123. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878). For an indication of facts giving rise to probable
cause to search mail, see United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
124. See, e.g., United States v. Peckley, 335 F.2d 86 (6th Cir. 1964); Santana v. United
States, 329 F.2d 854 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 990 (1964); Webster v. United States, 92
F.2d 462 (6th Cir. 1937); United States v. Swede, 326 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); People v.
Garcia, 62 Misc. 2d 666, 309 N.Y.S.2d 721 (Allegany County Ct. 1970). Prison officials can
intercept even first class mail. People v. Jones, 96 Cal. Rptr. 795, 19 Cal. App. 3d 437 (Ct. App.
1971). See Note, Prison Mail Censorship and the First Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 87 (1971).
125. Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904).
126. Post Office Act of 1953, 162 Eliz. 2, c. 36, § 58. See also Post Office Act of 1969, c. 48,
§ 80.
127. See REPORT, supra note 122, at 9-52; DESMITH, supra note 90, at 121.
128. REPORT, supra note 122, at 86.
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spite a rather persuasive analogy of such secretarial warrants to those
condemned in Entick v. Carrington. 129
2. WIRE COMMUNICATIONS
The English and American practice regarding interceptions of
wire communications parallel those regarding letters. In the United
States such interceptions are regulated by Title III of the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.130 That Act specifies
detailed warrant procedures in the form of an application for a listen-
ing order for both federal and state wire interceptions, and it contains
a statutory exclusionary rule of evidence for illegally obtained com-
munications. England permits wire interception to be conducted pur-
suant to warrants by the Secretary of State, and it is likely this
procedure will continue.13' While no detailed comparison between the
English and American procedures will be attempted, it is interesting to
note that the American statutory scheme goes far beyond the English
practice in protecting individual liberties. For example, the records
required to be kept are more complete, and authorized periods of
interception are more limited in the United States, than the record
keeping and duration recommended by the Committee of Privy Coun-
cillors appointed to study the English practice. 132 Certainly the pros-
pects of weakened administrative control and record keeping offered
by the Committee of Privy Councillors as arguments against requiring
judicial warrants seem remote in view of the American scheme. Both
countries are in agreement, however, that where in the view of a high
executive official .it is necessary, there is no limitation on executive
discretion to order wiretapping as a counter-intelligence measure to
protect national security, although the United States statute requires a
clear and present danger in order for this exception to operate. 133
3. EAVESDROPPING AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE
The United States statute applies the judicial warrant device to all
forms of interception of communications, whether examining letters,
tapping telephone or telegraph wires, or using electronic devices to
eavesdrop. This breadth of application of judicial control is due to the
129. 2 Wils. K.B. 274, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). See id. at 23-26; H. STREET, FREEDOM,
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE LAW 35-37 (2d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as STREET]. Entick v.
Carrington "conclusively repudiated" prior practices in the executive branch of government and
state necessary as justification for a trespass. Wade, supra note 44, at 356.
130. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970). For recent cases construing the statute, see note 118
supra.
131. See generally REPORT, supra note 122; STREET, supra note 129, at 35-41. See also
KARLEN, supra note 6, at 133-34. There is apparently regular interception of overseas cables
pursuant to power conferred by the Official Secrets Act of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75.
132. Compare REPORT, supra note 122, at 75, 84, with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2519, 2518(5) (1970).
133. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970). See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297
(1972).
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application of the fourth amendment to virtually all communications
in which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. Under Katz v.
United States, 134 whatever a person seeks to preserve as private, even.
in areas accessible to the public, is protected by the fourth amendment
from unreasonable search and seizure, regardless of whether there is
an interference with any property interests. Thus, even a conversation
in a public telephone booth is protected from being electronically over-
heard and recorded by the police. Except for instances involving
national security matters, all wiretapping and electronic surveillance,
whether public or private, are illegal under section 2511 of the 1968
Omnibus Crime Control Act.' 13
The English position in this regard is obscure. Although eaves-
dropping was a common law crime and could ' involve a trespass or
even a criminal conspiracy to violate the Wireless Telegraphy Act,
1949, English police apparently use this technique, and modern science
has provided them with amazing devices for doing so.
Little is known about the extent to which police and others
eavesdrop by these new methods: for example, by the use of
portable radio equipment which can be hidden in a briefcase
or even in a person's premises. One thing is plain: such
evidence will not be rendered inadmissible merely because
the police have to break into private premises in order to
conceal the equipment there. 136
C. Search Incident to Arrest
1. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DISPENSING WITH THE WARRANT
In both England and the United States the power to search
incident to arrest is uniformly recognized but variously described.
Common law and common sense provide ample precedent for the
existence of the power, but the definition of its scope has generated
considerable controversy. The American rules regarding the scope of
the search have been recently redefined and apparently have stabilized
satisfactorily, at least where the search is clearly related to the underly-
ing arrest; but where the relationship is not so clear, neither is the law.
Historically, there are two basic reasons for permitting this type of
134. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Cases other than Katz have hinged on the expectation of privacy.
E.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973) (no fourth or fifth amendment claim can
prevail where there is no legitimat expectation of privacy and no semblance of governmental
compulsion against the accused's person).
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). There are limits to the advisability of extending warrant
procedures to the authorization of interceptions by secret agents and informers. Kitch, Limits,
supra note 118, at 142. Conversations recorded secretly by one of the communicants are usually
not unlawful. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S.
323 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). The "uninvited third ear" is permissible
under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) (1970).
136. STREET, supra note 129, at 31.
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search. 137 The first is based on necessity: the dual needs to protect the
arresting officer and others from injury by a weapon, and to deprive
the arrestee of potential tools of escape. The search permitted to satisfy
these needs primarily affects the process of arrest itself. The second
reason is based on opportunity: the arresting officer may have the good
fortune to discover evidence of crime' Perhaps as "a surviving incident
of the historic role of 'hue and cry' in early Anglo-Saxon law",13 8 in
such circumstances seizure of the evidence to avoid destruction has
been permitted, 139 even though no power existed to search for and
seize the evidence pursuant to a warrant. A search which is permitted
for this reason, primarily affects not the process of arrest, but sub-
sequent actions such as the prosecution of the arrestee or the return of
stolen goods to their owner.
Searches for evidence incident to arrest, even evidence threatened
with destruction, are not inspired by the kind of necessity motivating
the search for weapons or tools of escape; neither are such searches
inherently limited to the immediate time and place of arrest. Con-
sequently, it is possible for such searches to be more protracted and
extensive than searches to prevent forcible resistance or escape. As the
scope and duration of such searches increases for reasons of police
efficiency and convenience, so increase the demands for judicial con-
trol through the warrant. Thus it is the arrest-based search for evi-
dence around which controversy has raged, as each expansion of police
power had inevitably eroded the influence of the judicial warrant.
2. PREREQUISITES TO LAWFULNESS
a. Arrest
There are two prerequisites to the validity of an arrest-based
search. Not surprisingly, first there must be an arrest. The arrest may
be with or without a warrant; the power "of search can attach to all
offences, not only to arrestable offences, but also non-arrestable of-
fences, when the arrest must be under warrant.' 40 In the United
States it is absolutely necessary that the arrest be lawful, since evi-
dence obtained as a result of an illegal arrest is per se unlawful and
inadmissible under the American exclusionary rule. English courts
reject the proposition that such evidence is ipso facto illegal. 141 This is
137. See Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 866,
866-69 (1969); Stephens, supra note 70, at 79.
138. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
139. The ancient practice was to bind a supposed thief and tie the stolen goods on his back.
Justice was swift "if by hue and cry a man was captured when he was still in seisin of his
crime-if he was still holding the gory knife or driving away the stolen beasts." 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 577 (1895).
140. Stephens, supra note 70, at 78. See also Barnett v. Grant, 21 N.Z.L.R. 484 (1902).
Even arrest of the wrong person may suffice. See Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
141. R. v. Palfrey, R. v. Sadler, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 416 (C.A.).
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unremarkable since English courts do not employ the exclusionary
rule. Only in rare instances where there is unfairness or oppression to
an accused is illegally seized evidence excluded from a criminal
trial. 142
b. Extrinsic Necessity
The second requirement is that the circumstances surrounding the
arrest indicate that a search is necessary because the arrestee may have
a weapon or may attempt to escape or because the arrestee may
possess destructible evidence. The power to search "does not appear to
attach because of the nature of the offence but because of the extrinsic
circumstances."' 143 In order for the search to be permissible there must
be some indication that the reasons for permitting the search in fact
exist. This requirement thus functions in much the same way as
probable cause in the ordinary search situation. The early English
cases were strict in this regard, requiring an affirmative showing that a
search was necessary, 14 4 but it is doubtful that the requirement would
be as stringent today. 14s Because of the more frequent use of weapons
by criminals in the United States, courts are inclined to give wide
leeway to arrest-based searches, and it is likely that more searches
upon arrest occur here than in England. Yet even in the United States
the requirement that there be some indication of necessity to search
has efficacy in certain situations such as traffic and vagrancy arrests. 146
At least in part this requirement helps prevent arrests being made
simply as a pretext for search. 147 It may also help prevent the results
of a search being used to justify the search itself. The search must be
justified at the time when it takes place, regardless of its success. 148
3. SCOPE AND DURATION
a. Generally
Assuming that an arrest-based search has properly begun, the
question of its scope and duration arises. English cases indicate no
142. See King v. The Queen, [1969] 1 A.C. 304, 314-19 (P.C.); R. v. Payne, [1963] 1
W.L.R. 637 (C.A.). There must be evidence of unfairness or oppression in order for exclusion of
otherwise admissible evidence to be proper. Callis v. Gunn, [1963] 1 Q.B. 495 (D.C.); R. v.
Prager, [19721 1 All E.R. 1114 (C.A.).
143. Stephens, supra note 70, at 78, 143. See also Wade, supra note 44, at 360.
144. See Bessell v. Wilson, 118 Eng. Rep. 518 (Q.B. 1853); Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim. Cas.
329 (1853).
145. English courts seem willing to expand police powers, believing there is more wicked-
ness about these days. See Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones, [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, 313, 315
(C.A.).
146. See, e.g., People v. Ricketson, 129 Ill. App. 2d 365, 264 N.E.2d 220 (1970); Note, 78
YALE L.J. 433, 444 (1969); Note, Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L.
REV. 347, 350. Regardless of the nature of the offense, however, police have full power to
conduct a complete body search of the arrestee. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973);
United 'States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
147. "An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for evidence." United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932).
148. Cf. Leigh, Recent Developments in the Law of Search and Seizure, 33 MOD. L. REV.
268, 271 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Leigh].
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limits upon such searches except, presumably, the vague standard of
"reasonableness" which is ordinarily applied to administrative action.
The issue has not been squarely presented because in England search
and seizure issues are litigated in the context of private suits for
damages or applications for the return of property wrongfully tak-
en.14 9 The necessity of deciding whether a particular item was prop-
erly seizable has tended to obscure the issue whether the item was
properly seized. As a consequence, English police make a practice of
conducting searches the scope of which would doubtless be declared
illegal were the practice contested. 15 0 American courts on the other
hand have had no dearth of such contests, and have often been
presented with issues concerning the scope and duration of searches
incident to arrest. Their experience has led to the abandonment of the
vague standard of reasonableness under the totality of circumstances
in favour of a stricter test.
b. In the United States
The bulk of American cases on the scope of arrest-based searches
have been decided since the Supreme Court extended the power of the
police to search from the person of the arrestee to the premises where
the arrest occurred. 15 1 Express recognition of a power to search the
place of arrest, justified on the same basis as the search of the person
of the arrestee for weapons and destructible evidence, first appeared in
Agnello v. United States 52 in 1925, but within two years the area of
permissible search was extended without apparent limitation to "all
parts of the premises used for the unlawful venture."' 5 3 This extension
was limited without elucidation in later cases.,' 5 4 and in Harris v.
United States155 the Court upheld, solely on grounds of reasonable-
ness, a four-hour ransacking of a handcuffed arrestee's apartment in
the course of which police. discovered evidence of a crime other than
that for which the arrest was made. After a brief retreat,' 5 6 in United
States v. Rabinowitz in 1950 the Court abandoned any limitation on
149. See Stephens, supra note 70, at 148-50.
150. See STREET, supra note 129, at 21-22.
151. For an historical treatment of the cases, see Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-Man's
Land in the Criminal Law, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 474 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kaplan]; J. W.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 87-117 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
LANDYNSKI]; Note, Permissible Search of Premises Incidental to a Lawful Arrest, 43 TEMPLE
L.Q. 180 (1970).
152. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
153. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927).
154. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931).
155. 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
156. In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), -and McDonald v. United States,
335 U.S. 451 (1948), the Court held that the reasonableness of an arrest depends upon the
availability of a search warrant. This imported a touch of necessity into the rationale.
19751
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
the power of police to search incident to an arrest other than "reasona-
bleness" under "the facts and circumstances-the total atmosphere of
the case."' 5 7 Under Rabinowitz a warrantless search incident to a
lawful arrest was permitted to extend to the area considered to be in
the "possession" or under the "control" of the person arrested.'5l 8
The Rabinowitz doctrine lasted for 19 years during which increas-
ingly broad and intensive searches became commonplace. 15 9 The
breadth and intensity of arrest-based searches increased because under
Rabinowitz the scope of search was divorced from the reasons which
gave rise to it, and the search was limited only by vague standards of
reasonableness and artificial distinctions of "possession" based on the
law of property. As a result of the broad Rabinowitz power to search
incident to arrest, search warrants fell into desuetude.160 Police typi-
cally availed themselves fully of the search opportunities presented by
making arrests at places they desired to search, even though delayed
arrest in order to make a warrantless search was unlawful. 161 Moti-
vated by glaring examples of police abuses under the constantly in-
creasing scope of arrest-based search, and unable to formulate rational
guidelines for limiting such searches under the Rabinowitz doctrine,
the Supreme Court overruled Rabinowitz and related the scope of an
arrest-based search to the reason for instituting it. In Chimel v. Califor-
nia 62 the Court held that the scope of a search incident to arrest may
extend only to the area necessary to prevent the arrestee from seizing a
weapon or implement of escape and to prevent concealment or de-
struction of evidence. Police decried this curtailment of power, 163 and
lower courts had some difficulities adjusting to the diminished scope of
permissible search,1 64 but it appeared hopeful that a satisfactory body
157. 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) [hereinafter referred to as Rabinowitz].
158. The Rabinowitz reasoning was based on the constitutional interpretative technique of
detaching the reasonableness clause [of the fourth amendment] from the warrant re-
quirements and permitting the reasonableness of a search to be determined indepen-
dently, without reference to the rest of the amendment. Search incidental to arrest was
justified as built into the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment rather than as
a historical exception to the general need for a search warrant.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 151, at 109. See also Comment, supra note 23, at 684-85, 692.
159. See Garfield, The Expanding Power of Police to Search and Seize, 40 U. COLO. L. REV.
491 (1968); Kaplan, supra note 151; Note, supra note 137; Way, Increasing Scope of Search
Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q. 261 (1959).
160. After Rabinowitz more than 90 percent of all searches in judicial decisions were
incident to arrest rather than pursuant to a warrant. TIFFANY, supra note 32, at 122; Note,
Search and Seizure Since Chimel v. California, 55 MINN. L. REV. 1011, 1014 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Search and Seizure]. "In populous Los Angeles County, for example, only 17 such
warrants were issued in all of 1954." Barrett, Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Illegal
Searches-A Comment on People vs. Cahan, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 565, 570 (1955). Much of the
reason for the growth of arrest based search can be traced to police practices under Prohibition.
Comment, supra note 23, at 684.
161. See, e.g., McKnight v. United States, 183 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Search and
Seizure, supra note 160, at 1014.
162. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
163. See, e.g., Carrington, Chimel v. California-A Police Response, 45 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 559 (1970).
164. See, e.g., Search and Seizure, supra note 160.
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of law would develop from Chimel. 165 Guidelines for arrest-based
searches were at least capable of being explicitly formulated, whereas
under Rabinowitz there was no rational basis for so doing.
Just a few years later, however, a more conservative Supreme
Court has given indications it may be retreating from Chimel. In the
1973 companion cases of Gustafson v. Florida and United States v.
Robinson 166 the Court held that Chimel did not limit the search of the
person of an arrestee. Regardless of whether an arresting officer has
reason to fear the existence of a weapon, whether the search could
possibly produce evidence relating to the crime or whether police
department policies require taking the arrestee into custody and con-
ducting a full scale body search, the search is permissible. Once a
lawful custodial arrest is effected, a full search of the person is permis-
sible not only because it constitutes an exception to the warrant re-
quirement of the fourth amendment, but because it is "reasonable"
under that amendment; the very fact of the lawful arrest established
the authority to search.
Gustafson and Robinson did not explicitly affect Chimel's limita-
tion upon search of the geographic area of the arrest. However, a
major theoretical premise of Chimel, that the "reasonable search"
requirement of the fourth amendment is an exception to the warrant
-clause rather than a co-equal standard by which searches are to be
judged, has been rejected by a majority of the Court. 6 Hopefully the
Court will not return to the haziness of Rabinowitz and Harris in
judging searches of the place of arrest by a "reasonableness" standard.
Chimel pointed out the "reasons" for area searches; such searches are
better judged by those reasons than by their "atmosphere."
c. In England
The English law regarding search incident to arrest and its scope
is much like that in the United States under Rabinowitz. Search of the
area of arrest for evidence of any crime is permitted without clear
doctrinal limitations upon its scope. There is an amazing paucity of
English cases dealing with search incident to arrest, the leading case
being Elias v. Pasmore in 1934.168 That decision went somewhat
beyond previous decisions by permitting search of the place of arrest
whether or not occupied by the arrestee. 169 Neither Elias v. Pasmore
165. See Note, Criminal Law: The Effect of Chimel v. California on Automobile Search and
Seizure, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 447, 450-51 (1970); Note, supra note 54, at 249. The Chimel rule
applies prospectively only. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
166. 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and 414 U.S. 218 (1973), respectively. Robinson is noted at 28 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 974 (1974).
167. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). See note 158 supra.
168. [1934] 2 K.B. 164.
169. See Wade, supra note 44, at 363. Previous decisions had been factually limited to
searches of an arrestee's person or dwelling or objects within his immediate control. See Bessell v.
Wilson, 118 Eng. Rep. 518 (Q.B. 1853). Leigh v. Cole, 6 Cox Crim. Cas. 329 (1853). See also
Dillon v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245 (1887); Pringle v. Bremner, 5 MacPh. 55 (H.L.) (1867).
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nor subsequent decisions which discuss it' 70 have indicated that the
scope of the search thus permitted is to be guided by any standard
other than reasonableness. It is apparently the undeterred police prac-
tice to search exhaustively without a warrant the entire premises at
which an arrest occurs, and even an arrestee's home when the arrest
occurs elsewhere. 17' While the latter practice is obviously illegal 72 in
the United States the former is not, and it is quite likely that extensive
searches of the place of arrest would be upheld as reasonable by
English courts, 173 just as American courts did under Rabinowitz. The
extent of litigation of such matters would indicate English lawyers
assume so.
D. Seizure of Objects Incident to Arrest and Otherwise
1. GENERALLY
While few English cases have been concerned with the scope and
duration of search incident to arrest, there is a plethora of decisions
regarding seizure of objects in connection with arrest and otherwise.
Such decisions unfortunately constitute the bulk of the English cases
on search and seizure. This propensity ignores the most important
considerations in favor of concentration on the trivial, since the ques-
170. E.g., Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 693; Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones,
[1968] 2 Q.B. 299. Decisions since 1934 have not dealt directly with the question of search and
seizure incident to arrest.
171. See ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE POWERS AND PROCEDURE, REPORT, CMD. No.
3297 (1929); REPORT OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTION OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE IN RELA-
TION TO THE CASE OF MR. HERMAN WOOLF, CMD. No. 2319 (1964); STREET, supra note 129, at
21-22; Wade, supra note 44, at 362-63. One police manual specifies that an arrestee's "room (and
house) should be thoroughly and systematically searched for any incriminating writings, clothes,
weapons, etc." C. MORIARTY, POLICE PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION 68 (6th ed. 1955)
[hereinafter cited as MORIARTY]. General search of this nature denigrates the specificity require-
ment of the judicial warrant. Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on
the Fourth Amendment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 689 (1961).
172. See STREET, supra note 129. See also James v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 36 (1965); Agnello
v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (search of arrestee's house located several blocks from place
of arrest).
173. Some very significant and influential English judges appear to be prosecution oriented.
Note the remarks of Lords Denning and Salmon in Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones,
[1968] 1 Q.B. 299, at 313, 319-20. Also, KARLEN, supra note 6, at 221, has remarked:
The lack of power in the Court of Criminal Appeal to order a new trial creates a
temptation to the judges to label an error as harmless whenever they are convinced the
defendant is vicious and guilty. That temptation is being successfully resisted at the
present time according to qualified observors, although it was not always so in the past
and may not always be so in the future.
While these remarks presumably were correct when written, this criticism may now be out of
date. A limited power to order a new trial was conferred upon the Court of Criminal Appeal by
the Criminal Appeal Act of 1964, c. 43, the Court of Criminal Appeal was superseded by the
Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, under the Criminal Appeal Act of 1966, c. 31, and wider
powers to order a new trial were conferred upon the Court of Appeal by the 1966 Act. See now
Criminal Appeal Act of 1968, c. 19. To the extent that the power to order a new trial is still
insufficient, however, the same temptations still remain. That police themselves have a wide
view of their powers would appear to be amply indicated simply by their decision to appeal in
Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 693. Presumably an American prosecutor would confess error on
the facts of Ghani v. Jones.
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tion of search for objects seems immeasurably more important than the
question of their seizure. Each question involves different individual
interests. The English.decisional tendency is due to the procedure by
which search and seizure issues are litigated through private suits
using ordinary civil remedies rather than in criminal cases from which
a body of public law could develop. The result of using the vehicle of
ad hoc civil suits to decide search and seizure issues is a directionless
morass of decisions which inadequately treat the great public issues
involved. The result inexorably is "haphazard and ill-defined."'1 7 4
2.. IN THE UNITED STATES
Decided in what is submitted to be a more appropriate context
and perspective, American decisions regarding seizure of objects are
fairly direct and simple. In general, police may seize virtually any
object connected with crime, whether contraband, the fruit or instru-
mentality of crime, or evidence of crime. 175 There is no constitutional
prohibition against seizure of any particular class of objects. 176 The
important consideration is the manner in which the objects are discov-
ered and seized. Generally, as long as the -seizing officer does so from
a lawful location without violating rules governing the search for
objects, and so long as there is sufficient cause to connect the items
with crime, 177 the seizure is permissible. A seizure is lawful so long as
it does not involve essentially trespassory intrusion into a constitution-
ally sacrosanct area such as a dwelling, a matter intimately related to
the question of search and the individual interest in privacy. 17 8 Police
may seize objects in open fields or in plain sight, 179 even if discovered
174. DEVLIN, supra note 5, at 53.
175. There is considerable variation from state to state regarding what may be seized either
incident to arrest, pursuant to a search warrant or otherwise..-For example, in some states
"private papers" receive special attention, and "mere evidence" cannot be the subject of a federal
search warrant under rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The principle that
instrumentalities of crime can be seized owes its existence to the early common law. "In the t3th
Century a metaphysical fault was imputed to an inanimate object such as a wagon or a sword
which had caused an injury. This fault made the object a deodand which could be seized,
condemned, and after purification sold by the Crown." Kaplan, supra note 151, at 478. Seizure of
crime connected objects could under modern theory be justified as an abuse of the privilege of
private property resulting in forfeiture of the privilege.
176. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
177. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Note, Probable. Cause to Seize
and the Fourth Amendment: An Analysis, 34 ALBANY L. REV. 658 (1970). See also Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
178. Compare Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971), with Texas v. Gonzales, 388 F.2d
145 (5th Cir. 1968). See United States v. McDaniel, 154 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1957). It is
sometimes said that where there is a seizure without a search, the fourth amendment does not
apply, but more accurately such seizures are "reasonable" under the fourth amendment. A further
variation of the doctrine was used in a recent case where a state inspector entered corporate
property at a point from which the public was not excluded and conducted air quality tests. Air
Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
179. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1934). For a recent discussion of the "plain view" doctrine, see Coolidge v. New Hampshire,'403
U.S. 443, 465-67 (1971). See also Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3,
237-50 (1971).
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
by use of a flashlight or a telescope. 180 They may seize. evidence of a
crime discovered during a search incident to arrest for a different
crime, 18 1 or items discovered during a lawful frisk for weapons where
no arrest has yet occurred. 182 They may seize evidence of crime
discovered while executing a search warrant, 183 including items not
specified in the search warrant which are similar to named items. 184
3. IN ENGLAND
The law of England regarding police seizure is similar to that of
the United States, although the same results have been reached in a
more roundabout way. 185 While executing a search warrant police
lawfully may seize items mistakenly believed to be included in the
warrant, 86 items likely to furnish evidence of the identity of other
seized goods as those specified in the warrant, 18 7 and items not spec-
ified in the warrant which constitute material evidence implicating the
occupier or an associate in crime.' 88 Items discovered in a search
incident to arrest may be seized if they are contraband, or material
evidence, fruits or instrumentalities of the crime for which the arrest is
made, 189 or if they constitute evidence of a crime committed by any-
one. 190 While early cases seemed to indicate that there was no right to
seize evidence during an investigation,' 9 1 doubts on the matter have
recently been dispelled by Ghani v. Jones 192 which prescribed a series
of rules permitting seizure and detention of material evidence of
serious crime. 193 Some cases have indicated seized goods must crim-
180. Cf. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559
(1927); United States v. Kim, 430 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1970). See Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216
Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
181. Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Harris was not overruled on this point by
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
182. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
183. Anglin v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 439 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Teller, 412 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1969); cf. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); United
States v. Old Dominion Warehouse, Inc., 10 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1926).
184. See Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
888 (1963). It is an unconstitutional evasion of the warrant requirement, however, to seize an
object not mentioned in a search warrant although police knew its location and intended to seize
it. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
185. See generally, Leigh, supra note 148; Stephens, supra note 70.
186. Price v. Messenger, 126 Eng. Rep. 1213 (C.P. 1800).
187. Crozier v. Cundy, 108 Eng. Rep. 439 (K.B. 1827).
188. Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones, [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, 313. Garfinkel v.
Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1972] CRIM. L. REV. 44; cf. Pringle v. Bremner, 5 MacPh. 55
(H.L.) (1867). For an indication of Australian law and the Chic Fashions case, see Pearce, supra
note 46, at 472-75. Such a seizure is unlawful in New Zealand. McFarlane v. Sharp, [19721
N.Z.L.R. 64.
189. Dillion v. O'Brien, 16 Cox Crim. Cas. 245, 249 (1887).
190. Elias v. Pasmore, [1934] 2 K.B. 164, 173.
191. Davis v. Lisle, [193612 K.B. 434; Levine v. O'Keefe, [1930] V.L.R. 70; R. v. Waterfield,
[1964] 1 Q.B. 164: Compare Davis v. Lisle, supra, with United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649
(7th Cir. 1971).
192. [1970] 1 Q.B. 673. But see McFarlane v. Sharp, [1972] N.Z.L.R. 64.
193. See Leigh, supra note 148, at 277-78. Additional authority for the proposition that
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inally implicate their possessor or someone associated with him,1 9 4
but this qualification seems meaningless since the goods may nonethe-
less be seized over objection if refusal to permit the seizure is "quite
unreasonable." 195 Undoubtedly all such refusals will be deemed un-
reasonable since "honest citizens must help the police and not hinder
them in their efforts to track down criminals"' 96 and refusal "makes
him look like an accessory after the fact, if not before it."', 97 Despite
the objection that innocent persons should not suffer when police seize
their property as evidence of some unrelated person's crime,' 98 it is not
wholly inequitable that "the right and duty of the police to prosecute
offenders prevails over the . . . right of ownership."1 99
E. OTHER WARRANTLESS POLICE SEARCHES
1. GENERALLY
Although search incident to an arrest is the major exception to the
judicial warrant requirement, there are other instances in which a
warrantless search lawfully may be conducted. Under certain cir-
cumstances not involving an arrest, persons or vehicles may be stop-
ped or detained in order for a search to be conducted. These stop and
search powers are based primarily upon statutes and motivated by
considerations of necessity. There is considerable emphasis in the
United States upon the requirement of necessity in deciding whether a
warrant may be dispensed with in a particular situation, and this
undoubtedly is due to the constitutional imperative of the fourth
amendment. Some English statutory stop and search provisions go
considerably beyond what would be constitutionally permissible in the
United States.
2. STOP AND SEARCH IN ENGLAND
One of -the best known English statutory stop and search powers
is section 66 of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1839. Under this section
police can detain property necessary for prosecution may be found in Tyler v. London & Swn.
Ry. Co., Cab. & E. 285 (Q.B.) (1884), which held that "police constables have the power to take
possession of goods for the purposes of a prosecution under a personal warrant of arrest." Id. at
286.
194. Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 673, 706; Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones,
[1968] 2 Q.B. 299, 313.
195. Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 673, 709.
The qualification is also a little disingenuous. If a policeman is on the premises by virtue
of a warrant, the circumstances would be rare in which the owner or occupier of the
premises could not be regarded as being in some way connected with the offence being
investigated. If the policeman merely happens to be on the premises, how is he to
determine whether or not the owner or occupier is a person who could not reasonably be
believed to be criminally implicated?
Pearce, supra note 46, at 474.
196. Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones, [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, 313.
197. Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 673, 708.
198. See Weir,, Police Power to Seize Suspicious Goods, 26 CAMB. L.J. 193 (1968).
199. Butler v. Board of Trade, [1971] 1 Ch. 680, 691 (1970).
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constables have power to stop and search any vehicle or person
reasonably suspected of carrying or possessing stolen or unlawfully
obtained property. Although this power is a local act of limited geo-
graphical application, similar local acts apply in a significant number of
cities and towns potentially affecting millions of persons. 20 0 Addition-
ally, stop and search powers of national application permit constables
to stop and search persons and vehicles reasonably suspected of violat-
ing statutes prohibiting poaching, damaging protected birds or their
nests or eggs, possession of firearms and possession of dangerous
drugs. 20  These statutes apparently confer power on police officers in
addition to those already existing through the power to arrest and
search arrested persons, since there need not necessarily be probable
cause that the person detained and searched had obtained the pos-
sessed goods illegally. 202
These powers apparently constitute the lawful extent of stop and
search powers in England. They exceed those constitutionally avail-
able to police in the United States, at least to the extent that searches
such as those for stolen goods or poached game are permissible in
circumstances in which an arrest-based search could not lawfully be
conducted. With respect to some of these searches, however, such as
certain searches for firearms and searches involving the stopping and
searching of vehicles, these powers are roughly paralleled and perhaps
even exceeded in the United States.
3. THE PROTECTIVE SEARCH FOR WEAPONS
a. In the United States
Because of the constitutional implications of warrantless searches in
the United States, those stop and search powers which have received
judicial approval have been the subject of considerable debate, and have
been carefully limited to satisfying those demands which call for such
power. The frequent use of firearms by criminals in the United States has
necessitated some power to conduct warrantless protective searches for
weapons in addition to those based upon arrest. 2 3 The Supreme Court
200. Metropolitan Police Act of 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 47. For a more detailed discussion of
local stop and search powers see Thomas, supra note 6, at 12-14. See also Williams, Statutory
Powers, supra note 30.
201. Poaching Prevention Act of 1862, 26 Vict., c. 114; Protection of Birds Act of 1954, 2 &
3 Eliz., c. 30; Firearms Act of 1965, c. 44; Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971, c. 17. Only historical
accident can explain why such powers should exist with respect to poached birds and the like but
not with respect to other items. Only the same whim seems to explain why such powers exist
respecting firearms but not explosives, for which even emergency search requires some written
authority. See Explosives Act of 1875, 38 Vict., c. 17. For an excellent discussion of search
powers under section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971 see the note to that section in Current
Law Statutes Annotated, 1971.
202. Cf. Sargent v. West, [1964] CRIM, L. REV. 412 (Q.B.). This point is discussed more
fully in Thomas, supra note 6, at 15-17.
203. The frisk for weapons is standard police procedure for dealing with persons who may
be armed. Comment, Police Power to Stop, Frisk and Question Suspicious Persons, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 848, 851 (1965).
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has approved a limited search for weapons not involving an arrest, but
only where the circumstances indicate such a search is necessary and only
where the scope is closely confined. In Terry v. Ohio the Supreme Court
held that
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of iivestigating this behavior he iden-
tifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries,
and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might
be used to assault him. 20 4
The scope of the search is limited to a patting of the outer
garments of the suspect in order to discover a weapon, and only upon
discovery of-an object which may be a weapon can the search proceed
further .205 Unfortunately, the frisk for weapons is subject to abuse, as
by its use for harassment. 20 6 The harassment is typically directed at
"low visibility" minority groups, and helps contribute to a lack of
citizen cooperation from those groups. 20 7 Despite these drawbacks,
however, there is little doubt the practice will continue with or without
court approval. 20 8
b. In England
The type of search permitted under Terry v. Ohio seems to go
beyond that permissible in England under the Firearms Act of 1965.
Under that English statute, police may search persons or vehicles
where they reasonably suspect the possession of firearms in a public
place or possession of firearms with intent to commit a serious crime or
to resist arrest. The Terry rationale is not limited to firearms but can
204. 392 U.S. 1, 30 "(1968).
205. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968); see Commonwealth v. Hicks, 434 Pa. 153,
253 A.2d 276 (1969). See also United States v. Cunningham, 424 F.2d 942 (D.C. Cir. 1970);
United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970). See LaFave, supra note 17, at 88, 91;
Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 866, 870-71 (1969).
Where a policeman has been specifically advised that a suspect is carrying a weapon at a
particular location, the police officer may, however, reach for the spot where the gun is thought
to be hidden, even though there is insufficient cause to arrest. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972). In Adams the officer did have sufficient information to justify forcible stop of the suspect.
206. Pilcher, The Law and Practice of Field Interrogation, 58 J. CRIM..L.C. & P.S. 465, 484
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Pilcher].
207. See Schwartz, Stop and Frisk (A Case Study in Judicial Control of the Police), 58 J.
CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 433, 463 (1967).
208. There is not the slightest doubt that an officer who believes he may be in danger,
based on any conceivable criteria, is going to conduct a frisk. If the officer feels his life is
at stake he will protect himself first and the question of admissibility of evidence will
have extremely low priority.
Pilcher, supra note 206, at 483.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
apply whenever possession of any type of weapon is feared. Also, the
power of search permitted under the Firearms Act seems to be little
more than the ordinary power of search incident to arrest. The Act
seems only to make it possible to search before technically placing the
suspect under arrest, 20 9 but does not expressly provide power to search
for protective purposes where possession of a weapon is feared but not
reasonably suspected. This distinction may be of little consequence
since English courts undoubtedly would hold that police may conduct
protective searches under Terry v. Ohio type circumstances by constru-
ing the Firearms Act to that effect or simply on grounds of necessi-
ty. 2 10 Because of the less frequent use of firearms by English criminals,
however, such searches are less likely to occur. Regardless, it is
difficult to imagine a protective search being litigated in England even
if conducted, given the rarity of controversial search and seizure
litigation.
4. THE STOPPING AND SEARCHING OF VEHICLES
a. Incident to Arrest
Another type of stop and search power is the power to stop
vehicles and search them for contraband or evidence of crime. This
type of search is to be distinguished from searches of automobiles
incident to arrest. The rules regarding this latter type of search are
similar to those regarding searches of premises such as homes, stores,
offices and other buildings. 2 ' If the arrest is invalid, a search sought
to be justified as incident to it is also invalid, at least in the United
States. 2 12 Also in the United States, the search must be substantially
contemporaneous with the arrest, and limited to its immediate vicin-
ity, 2 13 the "arrestee's person and the area 'within his immediate
control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which
209. This form of criticism was advanced by Professor Glanville Williams regarding offenses
under the Larcency Act, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 50. Williams, supra note 30, at 605. Though subsequent
cases make the argument inaccurate regarding theft offenses, Thomas, supra note 6, at 15-17, it
seems relevant to the Firearms Act.
210. Williams, Police Detention and Arrest Privileges, 51 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 413, 418
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Williams, Police Detention].
211. See generally Note, Automobile Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 47 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 232 (1970); Note, supra note 165.
212. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). Searches incident to unlawful arrests are not
necessarily invalid in England. That is, evidence resulting from such searches is admissible
except when unfair or oppressive. R. v. Sadler, [1970] 1 W.L.R. 416, 422 (C.A.). See notes 141
and 142 supra and accompanying text. Justice Stewart concurring in Gustafson v. Florida, 414
U.S. 260 (1973), pointed out that a persuasive claim can be made that custodial arrest for a minor
traffic offense violates fourth and fourteenth amendment rights. This argument places these
arrests in their proper context; are they valid at all? Unfortunately that decision is likely to be left
to the legislative branch, and thus may never be made.
213. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968); Preston v. United States, 376
U.S. 364 (1964).
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he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. '2 14
Presumably, there must be some likelihood of an attempt to seize a
weapon to resist arrest or to escape, and the crime must involve some
destructible evidence, although the Supreme Court has not ruled di-
rectly on this point. 2 15 Certainly a traffic arrest cannot be used as a
pretext to search for evidence of other crimes. 2 16 In England, presum-
ably, the permissible scope of an arrest-based search of an automobile
may be broader than that in the United States as it is for other
searches incident to arrest.
b. Based upon Probable Cause
1). In the United States
In the United States police have power to stop and search au-
tomobiles and other vehicles in certain circumstances where there is
probable cause to believe they contain crime connected objects such as
contraband or stolen property. 2 17 This power derives from Carroll v.
United States,21 8 in which the Supreme Court held that contraband
goods being illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle
could be searched for and seized without a warrant, so long as the
seizing officer had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained
seizable items. A warrant to conduct such searches is not. required
because of the "exigent circumstances" presented by automobiles
which can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
a search warrant must be sought. Typically searches pursuant to this
power involve automobiles on the open highway under circumstances
in which it is impracticable to obtain a search warrant, 21 9 but once an
automobile is lawfully stopped on the highway and the police have
power to make a contemporaneous search under Carroll, they have the
alternative power to seize the car, take it to the police station and
search it there. 2 20 A warrantless search based on probable cause is not
214. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
215. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968), the Court assumed,
arguendo, that a search of an automobile could be conducted incident to a traffic violation. See
Note, supra note 137, at 872, 878; Note, Chimel v. California: A Potential Roadblock to Vehicle
Searches, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 626, 647 (1970). As has been noted previously, Gustavson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), did not change
the rule of Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), that search of the geographic area of the
arrest must be based upon the likelihood of a weapon or destruction of evidence. Both cases,
however, involved traffic offenses.
216. Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
217. This exceptional power ordinarily depends upon statutory authority, and therefore the
category of seizable items will depend upon statute. Generally the items are limited to contraband
and stolen goods, though language in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), indicates
the possible class of seizable goods may be wider.
218. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
219. E.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694 (1931). But see Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) (automobile followed into garage
held within Carroll rule).
220. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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automatically permissible because an automobile or other vehicle is
involved, however, and some "exigent circumstances" must be pre-
sent to activate the exception. 22 1 The protections afforded au-
tomobiles are less than those applicable to homes. This is primarily
due to the fact that compared to a home, there is a lesser interest in
privacy inside an automobile, much of which is open to public
view.2 2 2
2). In England
English law- seems to go considerably beyond the Carroll rule by
permitting police to stop and search automobiles or other vehicles to
discover contraband or evidence of any serious crime, without regard
to whether "exigent circumstances" make obtaining a warrant imprac-
tical. 223 There is express statutory authority for stopping and searching
vehicles to discover stolen goods or evidence of poaching, damage to
wild birds or possession of firearms or drugs. 2 24 These statutes appar-
ently do not require any inconvenience or inability to obtain a war-
rant in order to be operative. Additionally, Ghani v. Jones22- indicates
that automobiles may be stopped and searched for the fruits, in-
strumentalities or material evidence of any serious crime, without
regard to the practicality of obtaining a warrant.
The decision in Ghani v. Johes was transparently intended to
overrule R. v. Waterfield. 226 In its haste to correct Waterfield, how-
ever, the Court of Appeal may have allowed more than was necessary.
Ghani v. Jones seems to permit any seizure and search of an au-
tomobile, and possibly other objects as well, to discover evidence of
crime, regardless of whether a warrant authorizing the seizure could be
obtained. This assessment of the import of Ghani v. Jones is based upon
221. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). It is not impracticable to secure a
warrant where there is
no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity on an open highway after a
hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no confederates waiting to
move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police detail to guard the
immobilized automobile.
Id. at 462; see United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970). But see Cardwell v. Lewis,
417 U.S. 583 (1974).
222. Szwajdowski, The Aftermath of Cooper v. California, 1968 ILL. L.F. 401, 410. This
was explicitly recognized in the plurality opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974).
223. Under the Road Traffic Act of 1960, 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 16, the police have power to stop
vehicles to check drivers' licenses or vehicles which are reasonably suspected of being driven
without owner consent. See Williams, Police Detention, supra note 210, at 418.
224. These statutes, Metropolitan Police Act of 1839, 2 & 3 Vict., c. 47, § 66, Poaching
Prevention Act of 1862, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 114, Protection of Birds Act of 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 30,
Firearms Act of 1965, c. 44, and Misuse of Drugs Act of 1971, c. 38, were discussed earlier.
225. [1970] 1 Q.B. 693 (C.A.).
226. [19641 1 Q.B. 164 (C.C.A.). See Leigh, supra note 148, at 278. In Waterfield two
constables were instructed by a superior to prevent the removal of an automobile which they
were informed had been involved in a serious offense. The owners returned and drove it away by
forcing the objecting constables to jump aside. The Court of Criminal Appeal quashed the
convictions of the oivners for assault, holding that the constables had no power to detain the car.
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the following analysis. First, the necessary implication of the decision is
that police may seize and retain any material evidence, or the fruits and
instrumentalities of any serious crime which is suspected or has been
committed. If the possessor of the desired item is implicated in commis-
sion of the suspected crime, the police may seize the item without consent.
If the possessor is not implicated in the crime, the police apparently may
still seize it without consent. This is because "honest citizens must help
the police and not hinder them in their efforts to track down crimi-
nals," 227 and "the police should be able to do whatever is necessary
and reasonable to preserve the evidence of the crime. ' 228 Refusal to
permit them to do so, even by an innocent victim, is "quite unreason-
able," and therefore consent cannot be withheld. 229 Also, refusal of
consent to the seizure makes the possessor "look like an accessory after
the fact, if not before it."'230 Since he is therefore apparently impli-
cated, his consent need not be obtained anyway.
Second, the power to seize evidence includes the power to seize a
vehicle and search it for -evidence. The police may seize an automobile
which has been used to commit a crime because it is an instrument of
that crime, and they may thereafter search it for any evidence, such as
fingerprints, which it may contain. 231 Clearly this would cover cir-
cumstances in which an automobile is knowingly iised to criminally
transport contraband or stolen property. These are the circumstances
to which the American Carroll rule normally is applied. The English
policemen's power to seize an automobile might also apply in in-
stances in which material evidence of any crime is being transported,
for the automobile could then be considered an instrument of a "con-
spiracy to pervert the course of justice. ' 232 Even if there is no power to
search or seize an automobile which is reasonably suspected to contain
mere evidence, but not stolen goods or contraband, consent to a search
and seizure could be requested. Under Ghani v. Jones, a refusal to
consent implies criminal complicity, or at least unreasonable non-
compliance which can be ignored. The Ghani v. Jones power of
seizure thus seems to apply not merely to a seizure without a search
but also to a seizure followed by a search or analysis of the seized item.
Ghani v. Jones has disturbing implications if the foregoing
analysis is correct. 233 First, its entire perspective is misplaced. The
inquiry should be focused on whether police seizure is reasonable and
227. Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones, [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, 313 (C.A.).
228. Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, 708.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. This example was given in Ghani v. Jones, [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, 708-09.
232. Garfinkle v. Metropolitan Police Comm'r, [1972] CalM. L. REV. 44, 45.
233. This analysis may be pessimistic. One writer suggests that the right to search is
presumably more limited than the right to seize. Leigh, supra note 148, at 272. Hopefully this will
prove to be the case.
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not upon whether refusal to consent is unreasonable. Ordinary citizens
have a right to be unreasonable but police do not.
Second, the reasonableness of seizure should bear some relation-
ship to whether a warrant could have been obtained to authorize it. 234
Incredibly, English police have no power to obtain a warrant to search
for or seize many crucially important items such as murder weapons or
even the bodies of murder victims. This was explicitly recognized in
Ghani v. Jones,23 5 and undoubtedly this defect helped motivate the
decision. Federal authorities in the United States, however, have no
power to obtain warrants to search for or seize items of only evidentiary
value regardless of the crime. Yet this limitation has not led American
courts to eliminate consideration of whether a warrant can be obtained to
authorize a seizure.2 36
The rationale of Ghani v. Jones does not consider whether obtain-
ing a judicial warrant to search or seize would be impractical. The
sole reason offered for the rule is "the interest of society at large in
finding out wrongdoers and repressing crime. '237 It is difficult to
rationalize the decision with a warrant-based system of search and
seizure since the judicial warrant apparently has no relevance. Be-
cause the power to seize is not limited to instances of necessity,
virtually all restrictions on police powers to seize evidence prior to
arrest or charge seem to have been eliminated.
Finally, the example of seizing an automobile to search it for
evidence indicates that some search powers are included, at least
where search or analysis follows seizure. While this may be tolerable in
the case of automobiles, if applied to suitcases, diaries and other items
involving more significant considerations of personal privacy, the
prospects are foreboding. Interference with the individual's interest in
the possession of his property through police seizure may not be too
much to ask as the price of an ordered society. With few exceptions,
substitutes are available. Also, the violation of a right to possession of
one's property is easily compensable. However, the damage caused by
invasion of private personal interests through search may be irrepara-
ble, and the price of order in these cases may be too high.
5. THE SEARCH TO PREVENT DESTRUCTION OR
CONCEALMENT OF EVIDENCE
a. In the United States
A further exception to the warrant requirement is that police may
conduct a search when the existence of the evidence is threatened, or if
234. The limitations imposed by search warrant statutes are apt to be subverted by Chic
Fashions as interpreted by Ghani v. Jones. Leigh, supra note 148, at 272.
235. [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, 705.
236. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Dorman v. United States, 435
F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
237. [1970] 1 Q.B. 693, 708.
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it is being destroyed. 238 Although one of the reasons for permitting
search incident to arrest is to prevent the destruction or concealment of
evidence, the threat of destruction may itself constitute justification for
a warrantless search independent of a contemporaneous arrest. Re-
cently in the United States this exception has been narrowly confined
to circumstances in which evidence is actually in the process of destruc-
tion, rather than merely threatened with destruction, at least when
justification for searching a house is sought. 23 9 This narrow construc-
tion would most likely be applied to searches of persons. 240 It may be
possible to impound a dwelling in which it is feared evidence may be
destroyed, 24 1 but there is no decisional authority for this proposition.
A warrantless search of an automobile might possibly be justified
under this exception where destruction of evidence is not actually in
progress, 242 but automobile searches constitute a separate exception to
the warrant requirement and are more readily justifiable under their
own exception.
A search to prevent destruction of evidence cannot be justified as
easily as a search for possible weapons such as in Terry v. Ohio. The
measure of necessity is less, and the degree of intrusion is greater. No
danger to life is involved, and a full fledged search is far more
intrusive than a patting of outer garments.
b. In England
English law regarding the search to prevent destruction of evi-
dence exception is difficult to assess. It could be said to be virtually
nonexistent under R. v. Waterfield243 in which police action to pre-
serve evidence of a suspected crime was disapproved; but in Ghani v.
Jones24 4 the Court of Appeal criticized R. v. Waterfield and indicated
that police have extensive power to seize and examine possible evi-
dence. Since the power to seize presumably implies some power to
search, and since the rationale of Ghani v. Jones was based upon
enhancing preservation of criminal evidence, it is likely that a search
to prevent destruction or concealment of evidence will be upheld
where destruction is threatened but not actually in progress. Even if
the English police have an independent power to search to prevent the
238. See generally, Note supra note 41.
239. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970).
240. At least where probable cause exists and a limited intrusion is undertaken to prevent
destruction of readily destructible evidence, a search may be permissible. Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291 (1973). But cf. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948).
241. See Note, supra note 41, at 1474-81; Note, supra note 28, at 446-47. There is normally
no objection to impounding a dwelling or preventing access to a location when it is the scene of a
crime, and it is standard police procedure to do so. See MORIARTY, supra note 171, at 62-64.
There seems to be little reason for not permitting similar impounding of the location of an arrest
even though this location is not as directly related to commission of a crime. The object of the
impounding-the acquisition and preservation of evidence-is the same.
242. Cf. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).
243. [1964] 1 Q.B. 164 (C.C.A.).
244. [1970] 1 Q.B. 693 (C.A.).
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,destruction of evidence, the argument for its existence is not likely to
be raised often. Because the scope of English police search incident to
arrest is considerably more extensive than that permissible in the
United States under Chimel v. California, 241 it is likely that police will
attempt to justify a warrantless search as incident to arrest rather than
pursuant to any other power. Threatened destruction of evidence
would thus be used to justify a wide scope of arrest-based search,
rather than as an independent justification to search.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES
a. Generally
At times, governmental officials other than the police engage in
search activity as a technique for law enforcement. Although not
conducted by police, some of these searches involve the enforcement of
criminal laws, either directly when the search is to enforce a law
having criminal sanctions, or indirectly when police accompany the
official conducting the search. Hence these searches fall within the
scope of this article. In the United States, all governmental searches
and seizures are controlled by the fourth amendment with consequent
attention to the judicial warrant requirement, but in England the
judicial warrant is not always applied to such searches.
b. Customs Searches
1). In the United States
One category of administrative search with inherently criminal
overtones is the border search by customs officials. 24 6 Pursuant to
various statutes and administrative regulations,247 American customs
officials are empowered to detain and search persons, baggage and
vehicles travelling across international borders in order to detect viola-
tion of customs laws. Persons in direct contact with a border area or
reasonably related to it, such as persons working in the border area or
engaged in suspicious activity nearby, are subject to such searches as
245. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The scope of search is probably even wider than the scope of
search permitted by Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973), and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
246. See generally Comment, supra note 106; Note, At the Border of Reasonableness:
Searches by Customs Officials, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 871 (1968); Note, Border Searches and the
Fourth Amendment, 77 YALE L. J. 1007 (1968). The recent case of Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), has applied ordinary probable cause requirements to searches near a
border where there is no probable cause to believe the border has been crossed. In Almeida-
Sanchez, an automobile was stopped and searched about 25 miles north of the Mexican border by
a roving patrol on a road that lies at all points at least 20 miles from the border. There was no
reason to believe the individual or the automobile had ever crossed the border, much less that he
had committed any offense. Under those circumstances, the search could not be justified under
the Court's automobile search decisions or administrative inspection decisions.
247. E.g., 19 U.S.C. §§ 482, 1582 (1970). Statutory authorization of customs searches
predates the fourth amendment. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat. 29, 43.
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are persons initially entering the country.2 4 8 The search need not be
conducted in the immediate geographical vicinity of the border. De-
pending upon the totality of the surrounding circumstances, border
searches may extend over considerable times and distances, 24 9 and
may be conducted at checkpoints a considerable distance from the
border. 250
Under the fourth amendment and in accordance with the general
rule regarding administration action, border searches are governed by
a standard of reasonableness. Border searches, however, need not be
based on the same standards of probable cause which govern ordinary
police searches inland. Rather, persons and vehicles crossing an inter-
national border may be searched simply upon suspicion caused by
signs of nervousness or uneasiness which provoke the curiosity of
experienced inspectors. 25' Similarly, trunks and envelopes may be
searched upon "reasonable cause to suspect" customs violations. 252
The greatest problems presented by these lower standards for
probable cause arise when border searches become particularly intru-
sive and intensive. Occasionally customs searches to detect narcotics
have involved not merely search of clothing, luggage and vehicles but
searches of the human body and orifices, as by requiring the suspect to
disrobe,2 S3 by probing the rectum or vagina,2 54 or by administering
laxatives or emetics or using stomach pumps. 255 Where border
248. United States v. Glaziou, 402 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1121 (1969).
But see Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
249. Castillo-Garcia v. United States, 424 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1970) (7 hours, 105 miles);
United States v. Garcia, 415 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1969) (2 hours, 20 miles); Walker v. United
States, 404 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1968); Rodriquez-Gonzalez v. United States, 378 F.2d 256 (9th Cir.
1967) (15 hours, 20 miles). See also United States v. Hill, 430 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1970).
250. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), recognized border searches
need not take place at the border but at its functional equivalents as well. Id. at 272-73.
Fernandez v. United States, 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963); Ramirez v. United States, 263 F.2d
385 (5th Cir. 1959).
251. See Comment, supra note 106, at 279. It is the crossing of the border rather than
proximity to it that gives rise to the exception, however. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266 (1973). There must be probable cause to believe the border has been crossed. Id.
252. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970); Note, At the Border of
Reasonableness: Searches by Customs Officials, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 871, 871-75 (1968). See also
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
253. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 425 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970) (disrobing held unlawful);
Witt v. United States, 287 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 950 (1962) (disrobing
held lawful).
254. E.g., Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1968) (rectal search held
unlawful); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1967) (vaginal search held
unlawful); Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 945 (1967)
(rectal search held lawful); Denton v. United States, 310 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1962) (rectal search
held lawful); United States v. Cortez, 281 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (vaginal search held
lawful).
255. E.g., United States v. Briones, 423 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1970) (emetic held lawful);
Arciniaga v. United States, 409 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 928 (1970)
(emetic held lawful); Blefare v. United States, 362 F.2d 870 (9th Cir. 1966) (stomach pump held
lawful); King v. United States, 258 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 939 (1959)
(emetic held lawful).
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searches involve such intimate body intrusions the fourth amendment
requires that there be a "clear indication" or "plain suggestion" that
the search will be fruitful. 256 This standard seems close to the ordinary
standard for determining whether there exists probable cause to be-
lieve an item is located at the place to be searched. When the search
"shocks the conscience" of the court under standards of due process of
law suggested in Rochin v. California,257 an intrusive body search
may be unlawful, but courts have been chary of using this rationale to
invalidate searches. 258
American courts, aware as they are of the judicial warrant re-
quirement, have been willing to apply it to administrative searches.259
Despite this awareness, however, courts have not yet applied the
fourth amendment to border searches so as to require a warrant to search
unless "exigent circumstances" make obtaining one impractical. The
decisions have simply held unlawful those searches deemed not based on
sufficient "suspicion" or, in the case of particularly intrusive searches,
"plain suggestion." No case has yet held a border search unlawful simply
because under the circumstances no reason appeared for not obtaining a
warrant. Perhaps "at some point in the ascending scale of intensiveness of
search a line must be drawn beyond which a customs officer may not go,
unless he makes a showing of probable cause before a judicial officer and
obtains a search warrant. '260 A court may eventually hold that a search
Warrant must be obtained, even when the search is based on a "plain
suggestion" or the higher standard of probable cause, unless exigent
circumstances provide a reason for dispensing with one. 261 That prospect
is not likely, however.
2). In England
The law of England regarding border and customs searches seems
to be both more and less restrictive of governmental search power than
the law of the United States. With regard to goods, vehicles and
persons being transported across international boundaries, English law
seems more restrictive in requiring reasonable grounds for administra-
tive action. Power to. search and seize vehicles and premises under
English customs laws, however, apparently are not restricted to prox-
imity of time and place of transport across international borders, but
256. "[T]he permissible intensity of search has been allowed to increase in direct proportion
to the degree of cause justifying intrusion." Note, supra note 28, at 439 n.31.
257. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
258. E.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432
(1957). Although the due process approach has the advantage of calling attention to the element
of pain or danger, Batchelder, supra note 106, at 192, it provides little guidance for searches
which are not brutal. McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note 106, at 22-23.
259. E.g., Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
260. Comment, supra note 106, at 286.
261. Cf. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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seemingly are applicable to situations which in the United States
would be considered ordinary inland police searches. To the extent
that search powers under English customs laws do not require strict
adherence to the ordinary standards of probable cause to search, they
are considerably in excess of what is constitutionally permissible in the
United States.
The basic English powers to search and seize under customs laws
are set fourth in the Customs and Excise Act of 1952.262 Under that
Act, the category of persons subject to customs search are those who
are on board or have landed from any ship or aircraft, or who are
entering or about to leave the United Kingdom, or who are within the
dock area of a port or at a customs airport. This appears to permit
searches of persons to the same geographical extent as under American
law since persons at a considerable distance inland can still be consid-
ered to be "entering" the country. That is the American rationale for
permitting "border searches" many hours and miles away from the
boundary. Vehicles and goods being transported across the border are
similarly subject to search. 263 With respect to persons and vehicles,
however, the power to search can be exercised only when there are
"reasonable grounds to suspect" violation of customs laws. In an
article discussing this aspect of virtually identical Australian customs
laws, Mr. E. J. Cooper has noted:
Reasonable suspicion is more than honest belief, and the fact
that items are subsequently found which add to the suspicion
is not sufficient. In an action an officer will be required to
give full particulars of his beliefs, and the fact that the
accused's demeanour was consistent with that likely to be
adopted by those engaged in smuggling is not enough. 264
This indicates that a higher standard for customs searches of
persons and vehicles is required in England than in the United States,
where suspicious demeanor is enough. Additionally, a person about to
be searched in England may demand to be taken before a justice of the
peace, or a superior of the officer concerned, in order to test the
reasonableness of the grounds of suspicion. 265 This seems to be a
reasonable provision and one which American legislation would do
well to include. The English statute also provides that no female shall
262. Customs and Excise Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 298 (2). See also
Immigration Act of 1971, c.77, § 4, sched. 2, which provides for powers to search persons
entering the United Kingdom to determine conditions of entry. This Act does not ordinarily apply
to local journeys or journeys to the Islands or the Republic of Ireland.
263. Customs and Excise Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 44, §§ 294-95, 297.
264. Cooper, Search, Seize and Question under Federal Revenue Laws, 45 Aus. L.J. 342,
354 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Cooper].
265. Customs and Excise Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 44, § 298(l)(b)(i). Since the
statute provides for one "or" the other, the section may possibly be satisfied by taking a protesting
suspect before a superior administrative officer and denying a right to appear before a justice of
the peace. This interpretation would seem almost to subvert the intention of the statutory safeguard
since such recourse would undoubtedly be available regardless of the statute.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
be searched except by a woman, but this is the general American
practice. 266 There is a further important difference, however. "The
power to search does not include a power to carry out or order the
carrying out of a medical or personal examination nor can a magistrate
make such an order. '26 7 Thus intrusive body searches present no
problem in England because they cannot be conducted, at least regard-
ing searches for contraband. Under the Immigration Act of 1971,_.
however, a medical examination can be ordered to determine whether
a person may enter the United Kingdom. 2 68
In one significant respect the power of search under English
customs laws is considerably in excess of what is constitutionally
permissible in the United States. Under section 296 of the Customs
and Excise Act of 1952, an officer may enter a building or place to
search for goods liable to forfeiture or seizure under the customs laws
pursuant to a writ of assistance. While the primary function of the writ
of assistance today may be "to protect against the award of damages
for certain acts during an action for trespass, '2 69 it was to protect
against such writs that the fourth amendment was passed. 270 This
search power would clearly be unconstitutional in the United States.
c. Other Administrative Searches
1). In the United States
Border searches constitute but one example of circumstances in
which administrative officers other than police exercise powers of
search as a technique of law enforcement. Administrative officials also
search in order to enforce a myriad number and variety of statutes. In
the United States there is a general warrant requirement for such
searches to examine dwellings, and other premises for conditions en-
dangering community health, safety or welfare. 2 7 1 In Camara v.
266. See McIntyre & Chabraja, supra note 106, at 19 for a description of the ordinary
American procedure for searching females. See also Immigration Act of 1971, c. 77, sched. 2,
part I, 4 (3).
267. Cooper, supra note 264, at 355. Under the Immigration Act of 1971, c. 77, § 4 and
sched. 2, there is express authority for medical examination by a medical inspector. It is not clear
whether this authority could be used to require medical examination of persons smuggling
contraband into the country, but presumably it could. The Immigration Act medical examina-
tions are apparently directed at determining whether a person has a right of entry and abode in
the United Kingdom, and it may be that some reasonable suspicion of that right must exist before
an examination is proper under the Act.
268. See note 265 supra.
269. Cooper, supra notc 264, at 353. See generally Parker, The Extraordinary Power to
Search and Seize and the Writ of Assistance, 1 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 688 (1962).
270. See Landynski, supra note 151, at 30-48; N. B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937). See also
Appendix A infra.
271. See generally, Note, Prejudgment Seizure of Chattels in a Replevin Action without an
Order by a Judge or of a Court of Competent Jurisdiction is Unconstitutional, 35 ALBANY L.
REV. 370 (1971); Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-A Rationale, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 288 (1965); Note, supra note 31, at 1120-26; Note, supra note 117.
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Municipal Court27 2 the Supreme Court held that except in carefully
defined classes of cases any administrative search of private property
violates the fourth amendment unless it has been authorized by a
warrant. Warrantless administrative inspections are permissible in
emergency situations such as when there is a "compelling urgency" for
a prompt seizure of unwholesome food or tubercular cattle or for
compelling smallpox vaccination or a health quarantine. 273 In See v.
Seattle274 the Court held the warrant requirement applicable to similar
inspections of those portions of nonresidential commercial structures
which are not open to the public. Consent to search is ordinarily
required 275 although it may be implied from acceptance of a state
license. 276 While the requirement may not be applicable simply to
nonforcible entry upon land not involving search of some structure or
object upon the land, 2 77 a warrant may be required where the entry
violates a reasonable expectation of privacy. 278
2). In England
The English law governing powers of administrative search and
entry is characteristically vague, jumbled and free from any uniform
application of the judicial warrant requirement. 279 Pursuant to a mass
of ad hoc statutory powers of entry, 280 there are a considerable
number of "very extensive and diverse rights over privately owned
land which are now possessed by a bewildering number of persons and
authorities. '28 1 A glance at the catalogue of statutory powers 282 and
the diverse procedures they entail, 283 indicates reform is desirable if
only for the sake of uniformity. Unlike the situation in the United
States under Camara and See, there is no generally applicable judicial
warrant requirement save in situations not covered by statute where a
search warrant presumably is required.
272. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
273. Id. at 539.
274. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
275. United States v. J. B. Kramer Grocery Co., 418 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1969).
276. People v. White, 259 Cal. App. 2d 936, 65 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1968). Similarly, a
warrantless inspection by a federal treasury agent conducted during business hours of the
premises, including places of storage, of a firearms dealer for the purpose of examining records or
documents required to be kept and firearms or ammunition stored at the premises, pursuant to
the Gun Control Act of 1968 is permissible as a proper enforcement and inspection provision of
the Act. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972).
277. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539-40 (1967); cf. Hester v. United
States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924). Warrantless entry of a state inspector upon corporate property from
which the public is not excluded, and, upon observation of smoke, testing for air quality, is
permissible. Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974).
278. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 348 (1967). Conversely, a warrant will not be
required where invasion of privacy is only "abstract and theoretical." Id.
279. See Waters, supra note 92; Waters, Rights of Entry, supra note 120.
280, See DEVLIN, Police Procedure, supra note 46, at 341-42.
281. Waters, supra note 92, at 139.
282. See DEVLIN, Police Procedure, supra note 46, at 341-42.
283. See Waters, supra note 92, at 139-148.
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3). The value of the judicial warrant
As a matter of policy the advisability of applying the judicial
warrant requirement is by no means crystal clear, although to do so is
consistent with the operative assumption of American law that war-
rants are necessary to lawful governmental search. Area wide inspec-
tions involve no implication that the persons searched actually violated
any law, and due to the self-restraint ordinarily exercised by inspecting
agencies, inspections are seldom very intrusive. 284 Also, unlike crimi-
nal searches the object in administrative searches is to force com-
pliance with the law. Since deficiencies normally can be hidden only
by the desired compliance with the law, generous notice of search is
preferable to surprise.285 Further difficulties with the application of
the warrant may stem from the relaxed standards for the necessary
showing of probable cause: "the routine issuance of warrants would
compromise any effective protection against improper searches and
perhaps undermine the existing practice of delaying searches at the
request of the individual homeowner. ' 286 Application of the warrant
may even be irrelevant to ordinary inspections, since consent to such
searches is nearly universal. 28 7 Nonetheless, uniformity itself is desir-
able, and an examination of the powers involved in administrative
entry is itself useful.2 88 Certainly a warrant-based administrative
search system in the long run appears more likely to protect individual
rights of privacy than a system with no prior judicial control. "The
warrant may constitute a sledge-hammer with which to crack a.
nut, ' 289 but "it is becoming increasingly evident that the right of
privacy, which inter alia the warrant has always protected, should not
go by default for want of legal machinery fashioned to accommodate
the new situation. 290
V. FOCUSED SEARCH OR ANALYSIS FOLLOWING SEIZURE
A. Generally
The last major area of police search, and the one least subjected
to the judicial warrant in practice, is police search or analysis follow-
ing seizure. There can be little doubt that analysis or examination of
persons and objects after seizure is a form of search which may involve
interference with reasonable expectations of privacy. Yet this form of
search generally has not been effectively subjected to the judicial
284. Note, supra note 117, at 526.
285. Note, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-A Rationale, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 294 (1965).
286. Id. at 291. To avoid this latter problem, the Supreme Court in Camara suggested that
warrants should be obtained only after consent to search has been refused.
287. Note, supra note 117, at 529.
288. Waters, supra note 92, at 150.
289. Waters, Rights of Entry, supra note 120, at 92.
290. Id. at 93.
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warrant requirement. There are some indications that judicial warrant
control may be imposed to a limited degree. Since developments in this
area seem limited to the United States, with no parallel in English law,
this discussion will be concerned exclusively with American law.
B. The "Inventory Search"
In the United States, a common form of subsequent search is the
"inventory search" of a person, his clothing and his personal effects
after arrest and before incarceration. Ordinarily police conduct a pre-
incarceration search as a matter of routine in order to prevent
weapons, implements of escape or contraband from entering the deten-
tion facility, as well as to preserve the integrity of the process by
providing an inventory of the items taken. Such searches have been
uniformly upheld when conducted routinely and "when [they are] not
used as a substitute for search without a warrant,"'29 ' although that is
exactly what they are. 292 Inventory searches of virtually any item in
police custody are generally upheld whenever the police take posses-
sion of the property in order to safeguard it for an arrestee. 2 93 It has
been suggested that some privileged form of "safety deposit box"
receptacle should be required to be provided for prisoners to store
personal items 294 but the cases clearly indicate this is not necessary.
C. Search Following Seizure Contemporaneous
with Arrest
Subsequent search or analysis of items seized in the course of an
arrest has also generally been permitted in the United States, on the
theory that the subsequent search or analysis is also incident to the
arrest. Thus objects located at the place of arrest have been permissi-
bly searched incident to the arrest when the search was essentially part
of the same transaction. 295  Generally, the cases involving these
searches are decided in the context of whether the search was within
the scope limitations of search incident to arrest. While such searches
may be permissibly extended to a wife or companion's purse which is
291. United States v. Fuller, 277 F. Supp. 97, 99 (D.D.C. 1967).
292. Police have full authority to search an arrestee's person and clothing at the time of a
custodial arrest and at the time of arrival at the place o f detention. Any clothing or items seized
can thereafter be subjected to laboratory analysis. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974). See generally United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 980 (1971); United States v. Stamps, 430 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Robbins,
424 F.2d 57 (6th Cir. 1970); State v. Dempsey, 22 Ohio St. 2d 219, 259 N.E.2d 745 (1970).
293. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Boyd, 436
F.2d 1203 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970).
294. Note, supra note 28, at 445.
295. E.g., United States v. Kind, 433 F.2d 339 (4th Cir. 1970) (examination of serial
numbers of TV sets in room of arrest); United States v. Molkenbur, 430 F.2d 563 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970) (search of cardboard box in back yard); United States v. Kim, 430
F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1970) (search of cardboard box sealed with tape in automobile).
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reasonably feared to contain a weapon,2 96 a person cannot be searched
merely because of his presence in a suspect automobile.297
Just as items located at the scene of an arrest may properly be
searched incident to the arrest, objects being worn or carried by the
arrestee may also be searched. Thus an arrestee's purse may be
searched, 29 8 as may a girdle 29 9 or other clothing being worn by the
arrestee.300 Clothes being worn by the arrestee may also be seized for
the purpose of subjecting them to laboratory analyses and tests when
the seizure forms an integral part of the process of arrest. 30 1
D. Search Following Seizure not Contemporaneous
with Arrest
Subsequent searches not integrally related to an arrest have also
been upheld in the United States. It has been held lawful to seize and
search suitcases by presenting to a bailee bus company claim checks
taken from an arrestee incident to his arrest. 30 2 Similarly, it has been
held lawful to seize and examine an automobile the keys to which were
taken during an inventory search of the suitcase of an arrestee and-
which, according to a hotel register, belonged to the arrestee. 30 3 Also,
a laboratory analysis of a suit siezed from a cleaning shop to which it
had been taken, has been upheld. 30 4
The reasoning of these three decisions is interesting. The first case
was decided on the theory that the subsequent seizure of the suitcases
obtained by presenting the claim checks was a part of the original
search at the place of arrest; the arrestee constructively possessed the
suitcases at the place of arrest since the claim checks were indicia of
ownership, the seizure of which was tantamount to seizure of the
suitcases. The court further reasoned that since the "seized" suit-
cases could have been searched at the place of arrest, the subsequent
search was justified since the police had probable cause to believe they
contained evidence pertinent to the case. For this latter conclusion the
court relied on Chambers v. Maroney305 which held that where police
296. United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189 (9th Cir, 1971).
297. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948); United States ex rel. McArthur v. Rundle,
402 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1968).
298. United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1970).
299. Lemons v. United States, 390 F.2d 346 (9th Cir. 1968).
300. E.g., United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1969). A full search of an arrestee
incident to a custodial arrest is permissible. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
301. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. Williams, 416 F.2d 4
(5th Cir. 1969); Hancock v. Nelson, 363 F.2d 249 (1st Cir. 1966); Golliher v. United States, 362
F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1966).
302. State v. Mejia, 257 La. 310, 242 So. 2d 525 (1970). See also United States v. Wilson,
163 F. 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1908).
303. United States v. Lipscomb, 435 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970).
304. Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1970) (the manager of the cleaning shop
apparently consented to the seizure).
305. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
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may lawfully stop and search an automobile, they may also seize it and
search it later at the station house. Given probable cause to search,
either course is reasonable. There are difficulties with this rationale.
Chimel v. California3 0 6 clearly rejected the doctrine of constructive
possession for arrest-based searches, and it is doubtful the seizure
could be justified even under the earlier standards of United States v.
Rabinowitz.30 7 If the seizure cannot be justified, neither can the sub-
sequent search by analogy to Chambers v. Maroney, since a sub-
sequent search under Chambers is permissible only when the original
seizure is lawful.
The quandary of the first case might be eliminated by applying
the rationale of the second case, which apparently assumed that the
subsequent seizure of the automobile was a part of the inventory
search begun at the station house, the automobile having been taken
into custody and inventoried in order to safeguard the property of the
arrestee. 30 8 That is, the court, rather than relying upon a theory of
constructive possession, could instead consider the search of the suit-
case as part of an inventory search begun at the station house, the
suitcase merely being obtained from the bus company and inventoried
as a means of safeguarding the arrestee's property. Of course it is not
entirely clear that any subsequent police search or analysis of lawfully
seized property is permissible without a judicial warrant. Though such
a search is probably legal, there is some authority to the contrary.3 0 9
Initially it should be noted that Schmerber v. California3' 0 im-
plicitly assumed that a subsequent analysis of an arrested person may
be subject to the judicial warrant requirement, at least where the
analysis involves intrusion into the human body. Lower courts, how-
ever, seem to regard Schmerber as dealing primarily with police bru-
tality and due process of law rather than with police search and the
fourth amendment. Police analysis of human beings not involving
intrusion into the human body itself, has generally been upheld even
though it may be degrading and may involve areas of intimate pri-
306. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
307. 339 U.S. 56 (1950). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
308. The court further reasoned that the only item "seized" from the automobile and later
introduced as evidence against the arrestee was the identification number of the vehicle which
could have been ascertained anyway under United States v. Johnson, 4.31 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.
1970) (en banc). Johnson held that an automobile owner has no reasonable expectation of privacy
for his automobile's registration number.
309. The third case, Clarke v. Neil, 427 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1970), indicated that any
warrantless subsequent analysis of seized property is permissible, although the three different
opinions in the decision primarily discussed whether there was valid consent to seizure by the
bailee. The majority opinion held that a subsequent laboratory analysis is not a search. In United
States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), the Supreme Court seemingly gave blanket approval to
subsequent search or analysis of items seized incident to custodial arrest and incarceration. The
Court did indicate there may be instances in which the circumstances of the taking may make the
search unreasonable, analogizing to Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), but it is
probably rare that such an exception will apply.
310. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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vacy. 3 '1 Generally, if the seizure.of the person or object is lawful, a
subsequent search by examination or analysis is permissible, no matter
how intrusive or humilating, save when brutality or some other excess
violates due process of law by "shocking the conscience" of the
court. 3 12
There is at least one case, however, in which a subsequent search
has been held unlawful because it was not authorized by a judicial
warrant. In Brett v. United States3 13 an arrestee was searched, incar-
cerated and given prison garb while his clothing and effects were put in
a bag for routine safekeeping. Three days later a police agent inspected
the contents of the bag, finding in the watch pocket of the trousers
cellophane papers which upon further analysis were found to have
traces of heroin. Purporting to focus upon privacy rather than
property rights, the court held that the search should have been
conducted pursuant to a judicial warrant.
However, Brett v. United States may not be overly persuasive
authority. The opinion itself had difficulty distinguishing other cases
involving search of prisoners' clothes, as pointed out in the dissent by
Judge Aldrich. Also, since Brett, the Supreme Court has decided
Chambers v. Maroney314 which held that, for constitutional purposes,
there is no difference between seizing and holding an object which
police have probable cause to search, and on the other hand, carrying
out an immediate warrantless search. "Given probable cause to search,
either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 3 15 The
Chambers rationale has been applied to a suitcase in police custody, 316
and could as well be applied to a prisoner's clothing. 3 17
It may be that future cases will further apply the judicial warrant
requirement to subsequent searches of seized persons and property.
The question is far more likely to occur since Chimel v. California31 8
restricted the scope of search incident to arrest, as this exception to the
warrant requirement was often used prior to Chimel to justify sub-
sequent searches.3 19 Where there is probable cause to search seized
person or property, however, the Chambers rationale may permit a
warrantless search. This seems reasonable and also the likely course,
although the Chamber rationale may not be fully applicable to searches
in which there are great expectations of privacy.
320
311. E.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fingernail scrapings); Brent v. White, 398
F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1123 (1969) (penis scraping of arrestee held
lawful).
312. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
313. 412 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1969).
314. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
315. Id. at 52.
316. United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971).
317. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
318. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
319. E.g., Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); United States v. Caruso, 358 F.2d
184 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1024 (1966).
320. But see United States v. Mehciz, 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing reveals extensive similarities as well as striking
differences between the English and American law of search and
seizure. A major difference between the two systems lies in the ordi-
nary method of redress for unlawful search or seizure. English re-
liance upon private lawsuits seems misplaced according to the Ameri-
can experience, in view of the unlikehood of a substantial recovery
except in flagrant cases (a mild deterrent at best), and from the
standpoint that no cause of action exists adequately to redress invasion
of privacy, the individual interest primarily affected by search. In-
deed, even though exclusion of evidence is the major sanction against
illegal search in the United States, an American plaintiff has better
remedies available in a private damage action than his English cousin.
It is possible to claim damages for illegal search or seizure as a cause of
action in its own right, with recovery possible for humiliation, inva-
sion of privacy and the like. 32 '
The primary reliance upon civil suits for damages is itself a factor
contributing to differences between the two systems. The effect is to
present a distorted legal development of the issues essentially involved
in police search and seizure. Public, not private law is involved. Police
cannot be treated as ordinary litigants; marshaled behind them are the
powers of the state itself. The policeman as a litigant is a shepherd in
sheep's clothing who simply cannot be treated as one of the flock. The
great public interests involved seem to emerge only superficially in the
opinions, and a proper public policy seems obscured by the judicial
perspective.
The American approach seems preferable at least to the extent
that it results in articulating a rational public law of search and
seizure. Unquestionably, the primary reason for the differing English
and. American approaches lies in the express American constitutional
prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. More rigorous
scrutiny of governmental search in the United States can be ascribed to
its constitutional implications. The haphazard English treatment of
search and seizure issues may well support an argument for adoption
of some form of Bill of Rights in England, although such a develop-
ment appears unlikely.
The course of future developments in the English and .American
law of search and seizure is difficult to predict. It is doubtful that any
sudden changes in English law will occur as a result of judicial
activity, and it seems extremely unlikely that English courts will move
towards adoption of a stricter exclusionary rule which would in turn
stimulate more litigation in this area. Changes in American law are
more probable.3 22 A quite tenable argument could be advanced that
321. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1970) (suit against state officials); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (suit against federal officials).
322. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court may begin moving away from rote applica-
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the modern American tendency in the direction of strict judicial con-
trol of the police is in fact contrary to a general trend over the past two
centuries toward permitting greater police discretion. Should the trend
of American decisions be altered, movement toward increasing police
discretion would not be surprising.
Nonetheless, this article has revealed a greater judicial willingness
to advance and expand individual freedoms and civil liberties in the
United States, much of which the English judiciary could do well to
echo, if not emulate. Recent events have clearly indicated that police
discretion is subject to abuse even in England. 323 The judiciary, both
English and. American, should and necessarily must exert some control
over discretionary police powers. A more active role in that regard
would be appropriate for English courts, and in keeping with the great
English common law traditions which have provided the foundations
for Anglo-American law.
VII. APPENDIX: AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT MAGISTERIAL
NEUTRALITY AND THE GENERAL WARRANT
The myth of the neutral magistrate is prevalent in American
search and seizure cases. It is often stated that the major purpose for
instituting the warrant system was to substitute "the more detached,
neutral scrutiny, ''324 "objective mind, ' 325  and "deliberate, impartial
judgment of a judicial officer" 326 for the zeal of "a police officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. '327
This reasoning was carried to its extreme in the recent United States
Supreme Court case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire.328 In Collidge a
warrant was issued in a murder case by the state attorney general,
who was then engaged in the investigation of the case and later acted
as chief prosecutor at trial. Asserting that neutrality and detach-
ment of warrant-isSuing authorities was constitutionally required, the
Supreme Court invalidated the warrant.
Such reasoning has been used in support for the retention or
expansion of the warrant system, and it has some current validity in
tion of the sanction of exclusion. See the dissent of Chief Justice Burger in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
323. Early in the morning of March 15, 1972, police simultaneously searched some 60 homes
ostensibly regarding the Aldershot bombing case, pursuant to warrants apparently issued under
the Criminal Damage Act. No explosives were reported found, but police nonetheless seized
various letters, photographs, passports, diaries and other papers. A further incident occurred in
September 1971, when police seized various papers and pamphlets of members of the Prescott
and Purdie Defence Group while executing a warrant under the Explosives Act. See Zander,
supra note 8. See also Letter of Mr. Paul Foot to the Editor, The Times (London), March 16,
1972, at 17.
324. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
325. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948).
326. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 (1963).
327. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110 (1964), citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-14 (1948).
328. 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
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the modern setting of law enforcement. Yet it has no basis in the
historical origins of the warrant system, and is only slightly accurate in
explaining the search provision in the American Bill of Rights. Far
from being a neutral official, the justice of the peace historically
combined criminal-investigatory, police-administrative and judicial
functions, hardly an amalgamation of powers conducive to neutrality
and detachment. It was not until the emergence of the modern police
organization circa 1829, well after passage of the fourth amendment,
that the executive and judicial functions of the magistrate were sepa-
rated. The present role of the magistrate in the warrant system
evolved historically from political processes and not from a quest for a
neutral curb on prosecutorial zeal.
The origins of justices of the peace are found in the twelfth
century with the Keepers of the Peace, knights charged with a general
responsibility to preserve the peace and quell disorder. But the initial
development of the justice5' duties and responsibilities began in the
fourteenth century. 329 At first the justices' main duties were to main-
tain general tranquility by suppressing riots and disorders, arresting
offenders and indicting and trying persons at quarter sessions. Gradu-
ally the justices acquired a myriad of additional responsibilities. Dur-
ing the Tudor era in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the justices
acquired such additional and disparate administrative duties as con-
scripting seamen and fixing various prices and wages. As instruments
of comprehensive Tudor economic regulation, the justices had
a considerable range of supervisory and regulative obliga-
tions, a little overwhelming in their number, and somewhat
bewildering in their variety. It was perhaps just as well in the
medley of duties thrust upon them that the justices were not
bothered with any fine distinctions between judicial and ad-
ministrative duties or criminal and civil jurisdictions. The
jumbled legislation lumped them all together. 330
The responsibilities of the justices continued to expand in the
seventeenth century. At that time the duties of the justices primarily
consisted of holding quarter sessions, exercising summary jurisdiction
over minor offenses out of quarter sessions, conducting preliminary
examination of persons accused'of indictable offenses, issuing arrest
warrants to constables, and exercising various governmental powers,
particularly in the administration of the poor laws. 33' It was at this
time that the justices began to use general search warrants to enforce
329. See generally C. A. BEARD, THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE (1904); G. R.
ELTON, THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION 451-70 (1962); F. T. GILES, THE MAGISTRATES' COURTS
(1963); F. W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 206-09, 231-33, 493-99
(1931) [hereinafter cited as MAITLAND]; F. MILTON, IN SOME AUTHORITY: THE ENGLISH
MAGISTRACY (1959); B. OSBORNE, JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 1361-1848 3-63 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as OSBORNE].
330. OSBORNE, supra note 329, at 12-15.
331. MAITLAND, supra note 329, at 232-33.
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laws regulating religion, having received the additional duty of
"searching of recusants' houses for popish books, which they were
directed to burn. '332 This general form of search power had been in
use in England since the first half of the fourteenth century, although
earlier statutes had not granted such powers to the justices. 33 3
The demeanor of the justices at that time, as would be expected of
someone wielding combined investigatory and judicial powers with
direct responsibility for preservation of order, was not in keeping with
the modern American image of a neutral arbiter. 334 In describing the
preliminary examination, for example, Maitland notes:
The object of it is not to hold an impartial inquiry into the
guilt or innocence of the prisoner, and to set him free if there
is no case against him; the justice of the peace here plays the
part rather of a public prosecutor than of la judge. 3 35
A blending of powers in the administration of the criminal law charac-
terized the performance of the justices.
In those times the justices of the peace combined in their
persons the functions of magistrate, policeman, and pro-
secutor. . . . "They raised hue and cry, chased criminals,
searched houses, took prisoners. A Justice of the Peace might
issue the warrant for arrest, conduct the search himself,
effect the capture, examine the accused, and sans witnesses,
extract a confession by cajoling as friend and bullying as
magistrate, commit him, and finally give damning evidence
at trial. '33
6
The justices of the peace "were the key figures in a flexible
administrative machine and they carried out both special and general
commissions, of which the commission of the peace was merely the
most regular and the most important. '337 The reason for devolving
such broad and significant powers upon the justices is that they were
an influential elite to whom such powers could be trusted. "As a group
they were wealthy, well educated, ambitious and in reasonable accord
with national policy both religious and political. '338 "The qualified
lawyers, the members of the House of Commons, and J.P.s in
Elizabethan and Stuart England were so closely intertwined that they
were essentially different embodiments of a single social entity. '339
332. OSBORNE, supra note 329, at 7. See generally N. B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 28-31
(1937) [hereafter cited as LASSON]. See also Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
HARv. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1921) [hereinafter cited as Fraenkel].
333. LASSON, supra note 332, at 23.
334. See P. DEVLIN, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN ENGLAND 3-7 (1960).
335. MAITLAND, supra note 329, at 233.
336. LASSON, supra note 332, at 36 n.86, quoting J. POLLOCK, THE POPISH PLOT (1903).
337. J. H. GLEASON, THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE IN ENGLAND 1588 TO 1640 96 (1969).
338. Id.
339. Id. at 122.
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"The justices . . . were competent members of the ruling class, and
nothing was more natural than that a parliament of landowners . . .
should trust them with all manner of duties and governmental pow-
ers."3 40 But the trust of parliament was in their political and religious
conformity and acceptability, not in their neutrality and impartiality
toward an accused in the administration of the criminal law.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a burgeoning use of
general and unrestricted powers of search, primarily extra-legally, by
agents of the king, although at times they were aided by acts of
Parliament. Eventually the common law formulated limitations which
were judicially imposed upon such arbitrary practices, but this was a
political phenomenon divorced from any considerations of reforming
criminal procedure. The common law was simply used as a tool to
limit arbitrary'royal power; the vehicle used by dissident factions to
avoid suppression. It was successful in view of its libertarian nature
and popular appeal, but it was nonetheless a function of the political
process. Similarly in America, limitations upon search and seizure
were directed against general -warrants and writs of assistance used to
suppress political dissent and to enforce unpopular tax measures, with
the search issue seized upon by anti-Federalist forces during their
attempts to defeat adoption of the Constitution. The neutrality of a
magistrate vis-a-vis criminal defendants played no part in this process
because such neutrality did not exist.
The history of the major growth and subsequent curtailment of
general warrants in England revolves initially around the Privy Coun-
cil and the Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission in the
seventeenth century, and it continues with the use of such warrants in
the eighteenth century by excise men and secretaries of state. 341 In the
seventeenth century unrestricted powers of search were used to enforce
the system of prior state censorship over all publications, a system
which was used to suppress sedition and religious dissent. The Privy
Council used general warrants to discover documentary evidence
against those who resisted the duty of "tonnage and poundage." They
were also used, in one infamous episode, to search the house of Sir
Edward Coke, the great authority on the common law and an influen-
tial Crown opponent, for evidence of sedition. Star Chamber enforced
strict censorship of all printed matter by providing searchers with
general authority to search whenever they saw fit. Even after the
abolition of the. Courts of Star Chamber and High Commission in
1640, and the expiration of the Licensing Act in 1679, similar methods
continued to be used. 342 During the eighteenth century general war-
340. MAITLAND, supra note 329, at 494.
341. See generally J. W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT
20-30 (1966); LASSON, supra note 9, at 28-50; F. S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN
ENGLAND: 1476-1776 (1952).
342. Searches were conducted following a questionable decision that the common law
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rants were commonly used by customs officers in the enforcement of
various tax measures. They also came to be used under a practice
whereby secretaries of state issued such warrants to search and arrest
for seditious libel and similar offenses. But by 1765, crystallization of
public opinion and parliamentary displeasure coincided with a series of
judicial decisions which outlawed the general warrant.
The rationale for limiting the general search warrant began with
common law commentators' discussions of the power of justices of the
peace to issue arrest and search warrants. Although Coke denied the
existence of any common law power forcibly to enter a dwelling to
search, the practice of doing so pursuant to both general and specific
warrants issued by justices of the police had gradually developed. 343 Sir
Mathew Hale in his History of the Pleas of the Crown in 1713 expres-
sed as the law or recommended practice the basic standards which
eventually were applied to invalidate the general warrant. Hale stated
that the warrant should be based upon sworn testimony constituting
"probable cause to suspect" the requisite facts demonstrating a particu-
lar crime or the precise location of the objects of search. 344 The
concepts advanced by Hale regarding the common law warrant began
to have effect during the eighteenth century on legislative grants of the
power to search. Excise laws began to omit provisions for writs of
assistance, and in 1733 the inclusion of unrestricted search powers in
one important excise measure was used by opponents to help defeat it.
Similar popular opposition was aroused in 1763 in attempts to defeat a
cider tax, as "a consciousness that such authority was arbitrary and
inconsiderate of the liberties of the subject began to filter into par-
liamentary legislation."345
In a series of cases from 1763 to 1765 the general warrant was
judicially repudiated. The decisions arose out of the practice of sec-
retaries of state to issue general warrants of arrest and search in the
prosecution of seditious libel cases. In 1762 John Wilkes anonymously
published a pamphlet, the North Briton, Number 45, which Lord
Halifax, the Secretary of State, deemed seditious. Halifax issued a
warrant, general as to the persons to be arrested, the places to be
searched and the material to be seized, instructing four messengers to
find and seize the publishers of the pamphlet, together with their
papers. Arresting 49 people in the process, the messengers eventually
located the pamphlet's printer from whom they learned Wilkes was its
author. The messengers then arrested Wilkes and, accompanied by an
prohibited uncensored publishing. The judge who delivered the opinion was eventually im-
peached inter alia for issuing general warrants. See LASSON, supra note 332, at 38.
343. Apparently the practice arose out of issuance of a documentary "hue and cry" to
constables. See C. K. ALLEN, THE QUEEN'S PEACE 136-38 (1953); T. A. CRITCHLEY, A HISTORY
OF POLICE IN ENGLAND AND WALES 1900-1966 6-7, 11-12 (1967); 1 J. F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY
OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 190 (1883).
344. See LASSON, supra note 332, at 34-37.
345. Id. at 23.
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undersecretary of state, later searched Wilkes' house and seized vari-
ous of his private papers.
A group of printers arrested by the messengers in the course of
their search sued the messengers for false imprisonment, 34 6 and Wilkes
sued the undersecretary of state who had supervised the search. 34 7
Both suits were successful, as was a third suit by a printer against the
messengers. The government appealed the latter case the Court of
King's Bench. 34 8 In the first pair of decisions, Chief Justice Pratt
labelled the warrants "worse than-the Spanish Inquisition" and "totally
subversive" of personal liberty. 349 The appeal in the third case was
decided upon a narrow point, but the King's Bench judges took the
opportunity in dicta-to declare the warrants invalid.
The success of Wilkes and the printers in their suits evidently
inspired John Entick, another pamphlet author whose books and
papers had been similarly seized six months before the Wilkes episode,
to sue the messengers who had seized his papers. 35 0 Entick was
successful and the action was appealed to the Court of Common Pleas
where in 1765, "Pratt, now Lord Camden, delivered the opinion of the
court, an opinion which has since been denominated a landmark of
English liberty by the Supreme Court of the United States."' 35 1 The
classic decision was the culmination of the judicial efforts to void the
use of general warrants. The House of Commons one year later be-
.latedly declared that general warrants were illegal except as spe-
cifically provided for by an act of Parliament.
The American experience with general warrants was more mun-
dane but aroused passions nonetheless. Where the major developments
in English law principally concerned political expression, American
attention was focused upon the use of writs of assistance by customs
officers to prevent the smuggling of goods. Smuggling in contravention
of prohibitive import duties and regulations, designed to protect En-
glish commerce and industry by restricting colonial trade, was a favo-
rite colonial pastime initially ignored by the authorities. When strict
enforcement of the trade laws became necessary to prevent the colonies
from trading with countries at war with England, writs of assistance
came into frequent use to search for uncustomed or prohibited goods. 352
346. Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. K.B. 206, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (1763).
347. Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153, 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
348. Leach v. Money, 3 Burr. 1742, 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 (K.B. 1765).
349. The general warrant decisions did Pratt's reputation and career no harm. He became
one of the most popular men in England and received numerous awards. "Pratt's opinions on the
question of the general warrants, moreover, were directly responsible for his subsequent elevation
to the peerage in 1765 and to the lord chancellorship in 1766." LASSON, supra note 9, at 46.
Doubtless Pratt had an inkling of the likely reception to his opinions, but in fairness to him it
should be noted that as attorney general in 1760 Pratt delivered a similar opinion to William Pitt,
then Secretary of State. Pitt ignored the opinion. See id. at 49.
350. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
351. LASSON, supra note 332, at 47, referring to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
352. See Fraenkel, supra note 332, at 364.
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These writs were virtually unrestricted authority for officials in
their absolute discretion to search any location at nearly any time, and
once issued they were valid during the lifetime of the reigning monarch
and for six months thereafter.
Following the death of George II in 1761, a group of Boston
merchants represented by James Otis challenged the legality of issuing
writs of assistance to replace those which had expired six months after
the King's death. Otis delivered a stirring denunciation of the search
practice which was later singled out by John Adams as the first step
toward the revolution 15 years later. The merchants were unsuccess-
ful, and after all doubts of the legality of the writs were dispelled by
their explicit authorization in 1767 by one of the Townshend Acts,
both smuggling and the writs flourished under increasingly restrictive
trade laws. Use of the writs was not uniform, and prior to the
Townshend Act, few or none were issued in some of the colonies. But
by the time of the American Revolution, the opposition to unrestricted
search practices was widespread. The opposition was not, however,
consistent and universal: the Continental Congress itself authorized the
arrest of certain persons and the seizure of their papers "of a political
nature." 3- 3 Neither was the issue overriding, as no mention of general
warrants or writs of assistance is to be found in the listing of colonial
grievances in the Declaration of Independence.
The proceedings leading up to the adoption of the fourth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution demonstrate that the reasons
for its prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures was to pre-
clude use of general warrants and writs of assistance by specifying the
requirements of probable cause, oath and particularity for a warrant.
The amendment was intended to prevent the distasteful experience of
the colonists with arbitrary customs officials. Such debate as occurred
was due to the issue that the absence of a bill of rights provided as fuel for
anti-Federalist forces in their attempts to prevent ratification of the
Constitution. Once the debates over ratification had ended, and the new
Congress had convened to draft the proposals which eventually became
the Bill of Rights, passions had quieted so markedly that due to neglect
the amendment was submitted to the states for ratification in its present
form despite the fact that it had been rejected by a considerable majority
of the House of Representatives. 35 4 The rejected form of the amendment
attempted to make a change of substance, changing the amendment from
one directed solely to specifying the elements of a valid warrant to one
353. LASSON, supra note 332, at 76-78.
354. During debates on the amendment the House resolved itself into a committee of the
whole. A proposal to change the phraseology of the amendment from a single-clause sentence as it
then stood into its present two-clause form was voted down. The committee to arrange the
amendments as they were passed (chaired by the individual who had offered the defeated
alteration) reported the amendment in the form which had been rejected. Apparently no one in
the House noticed the change, and in that form the Senate received and passed it, and the states
ratified it. See LASSON, supra note 332, at 101-03.
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with two separate clauses. The first prohibited unreasonable searches
generally, and the second was directed to the essentials of a warrant. Yet
the change went unnoticed. This history hardly bespeaks an amendment
intended to require warrants wherever possible. Unquestionably it pro-
vides no support for the assertion that the constitutional warrant re-
quirement was intended to substitute the detached judgment of a magis-
trate for the chase haste of a policeman.
Even more persuasive of the position that magisterial neutrality in
a criminal setting was not part of the purpose of the warrant require-
ment of the fourth amendment, is the fact that until the nineteenth
century a separate police organization did not exist. Justices of the
peace exercised considerable power over constables from an early
time.3 5 5 Their active participation in adminstration of the criminal law
continued far into the nineteenth century and well past the creation of
the first regular police forces in 1829.356
The police force was instituted primarily as a preventive
body, intended to discourage the commission of crime, rather
than to establish the case against the author of ,a crime after
it had been committed, for such functions were, in theory at
any rate, regarded as being within the province of the jus-
tices. Indeed, for some ten years after the formation of the
Metropolitan police, London Magistrates persisted in dis-
charging these functions, and maintained their own staffs of
investigating and interrogating officers in opposition, so to
speak, to the regular force. 357 To some extent, at least, this
English practice [of active criminal investigation by the
magistrate] was brought to colonial America. Massachusetts
gave investigatory powers to its magistrates, and as late as
1850 the New York Code Commissioners expressed concern
over the extent of discretion vested in the magistrate. How-
ever, in some American colonies the English practice was not
adopted and as Professor Moley reported, "the early de-
velopment of the county prosecutor as an aggressive agent of
law enforcement, and the power and prestige of the sheriff in
355. From early times the justices superceded officers of a merely local origin. Their
higher social status marked them out as the constable's natural mentor, and for many
years the justice was regarded as the superior, the constable as the inferior, conservator
of the peace. Commonly the justice would be the lord of the manor, and he or his
steward would preside over the leet court, by which the constable as a principal officer
of the manor, was appointed. Thus the constable was the justice's man, 'the lowe and
lay minister of the peace', a general factation in carrying out, under the authority of the
justice, the affairs of the manor. He became the executive agent of the justice in much
the same way that he remained the agent of the manor, or parish ....
CRITCHLEY, supra note 343, at 9.
356. For example, in the late eighteenth century magistrates actively encouraged use of the
then current system of rewards in crime detection, 2 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
CRIMINAL LAW 108-09 (1956), imposed fines on neglectful constables, id. at 161-63, and had
powers relating to organization of constabularies as late as 1857, CRITCHLEY, supra note 343, at
98, 117. Stipendiary magistrates were even used as administrators of the first organized police
forces. Id. at 42-43, 63.
357. Williams, Questioning by the Police: Some Further Points, 1960 CRIM. L. REv. 352.
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all frontier communities, probably prevented the justice of
the peace and the city magistrates from assuming much im-
portance as investigators of crimes and suspected crimi-
nals. "358
While the investigatory duties of the magistrate may not have
been fully exported from England to the United States, to some extent
they were. Also, there is no doubt but that under the English practice.
the justices of the peace had significant law enforcement duties which
were not relinquished until well after the advent of a separate profes-
sional police. The neutrality of the magistrate, then, is a modern
invention possible only under the modern framework of law enforce-
ment. Despite the importance attached to magisterial neutrality and
impartiality today by the United States Supreme Court, it has no
historical support.
358. Barrett, Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or Charge, 50 CALIF.
L. REV. 11, 17 (1962), citing MOLEY, OUR CRIMINAL COURTS 20 (1930).
